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
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PENDAHULUAN OLEH KETUA JABATAN SEJARAH UNIVERSITI MALAYA

Seminar Sejarah Malaysia mencherminkan wujudnya kechenderongan dikalangan penuntut untuk membinchangkan beberapa masalah terpilih dalam Sejarah dan dasar luar negeri Malaysia. Penerbitan kertas2 Seminar itu akan menyebarkan perbinchangan dikalangan para pendengar yang lebih ramai.

Satu daripada Seminar itu, sekurang2nya, telah dijalankan samasekali dalam Bahasa Malaysia. Memang sesuaiilah Seminar itu berkenaan dengan Nasionalisma Malaysia. Setakat ini tulisan2 sejarah perihal Malaysia dalam Bahasa Malaysia amat kurangnya.

Kaum akademik antarabangsa terutama sekali menerima Bahasa

Ingeris sebagai *lingua franca*-nya. Walau-pun ini mungkin dapat memupuk perhubungan diantara para sarjana, ia tidak dapat membantu darisegi menimbulkan fahaman yang lebih baik tentang sejarah Malaysia dikalangan orang ramai. Sarjana2 dinegara ini perlu berchakap bukan saja dengan sarjana2 lain tetapi juga dengan rakyat. Dibidang Sejarah Malaysia, sejarawan2 harus memberitahu rakyat tentang jupmaan2 mengenai akar umbi negara ini.

Persatuan Sejarah Universiti Malaya memang insaf tentang aliran didalam negara ini. Pada tahun2 kemudian ia mungkin dapat meluaskan kegiatan2nya untuk menchapai matalamat2nya.

KRISHNAN JIT,

Pemangku Ketua

Jabatan Sejarah.

Universiti Malaya.

SEPATAH KATA

This publication represents a series of lectures which were delivered at the Seminar on Malaysian history between the 23rd to 25th of September 1971.

It is divided into three parts. The first covers the first day's proceedings. The question posed was 'The Problems of Writing Malaysian History'. Three eminent historians, including a Professor of History examine these problems. Some suggestions are given to overcome them.

In the next part the participants in the seminars—a lecturer, a journalist and a politician—seek to answer the question 'Did Malaysia Have A Nationalist Movement?'. The treatment of this question involves much interesting information. The politician particularly had a part in moulding the course of events.

The final part, moving out of the web of Malaysia's past, deals with a current affairs problems. An academician and a journalist examine the prospects of Malaysia's Neutralization Policy.

In publishing these papers, it is hoped to stimulate further interest and provoke more thought on the subjects covered. Further it is hoped that this publication will be a milestone in the assessment of the contemporary problems, and will be useful for future reference.

The Editors wish to express their gratitude to everyone who helped in making the Seminar and this publication possible.

PENYUSUN.

WRITING AND TEACHING MODERN MALAYSIAN HISTORY POTENTIAL FOR INQUIRY

DR. PHILIP LOH

Thomas Cochrane in a recent study of the relationship between social science and history takes a somewhat extreme point of view, namely, that "History, if it is to hold its high place in the field of learning, must suggest policies for meeting current problems."¹ For many historians this remains at best a pious hope, at worst an unhistorical proposition. For this remains at best a pious hope, at worst an unhistorical proposition. For the teacher of history Cochrane's point has both pertinence and validity. A history text that could in some way transcend the past and reflect the concerns of the present, exploring beyond what happened to the reasons why it happened and its possible significance for present problems serves more readily the objectives of the classrooms, the need for an inquiry approach to the study of historical facts. History as an inquiry process going beyond the more descriptive account of past happenings begins with a problem, question or hypothesis to be tested. Historical inquiry begins not only with a problem but requires a framework of theory for the determination of the manner in which the inquiry is conducted and the conclusions reached. Furthermore, a particular historical situation though not without its own uniqueness is nonetheless what anthropologists would describe as a patterned situation, that is, the behavioral processes at work within that situation share similar characteristics of situations in other places and at other periods of history. To go beyond linear historical narration requires the methodology of other disciplines. In sum, three elements are essential to historical inquiry, a problem, a theoretical framework for dealing with the problem and the relevant knowledge from history and the social sciences.

More specifically history as a discipline for the purposes of inquiry-centered teaching functions as follows: (1) by providing episodes that concretely suggest relationships, concepts, rules of action or principles (e.g. the Chinese settlement of mining workers in the Western region of Malaysia may suggest many hypotheses about cultural diffusion, social control and social change); (2) by offering cases of relationships where a hypothesis may be more precisely tested (e.g. the relationship between the rule of law and the abolition of slavery in the Malay States, or the relationship between constitutional government and freedom can be more fully examined by a comparison of the histories of different states); (3) by its methodology, in particular its documentation procedures and its concern with both the authenticity of its primary sources and the accuracy of its secondary ones.

History as a discipline has a great potential for inquiry processes in the classroom. My concern is with its lack of fulfilment in the Malaysian classroom. My hypothesis is that the current school texts

on Malaysian history accounts for a good part of this untapped potential. How could the school text be improved in order that history becomes a more meaningful experience in the school? I propose to answer this question at two levels (a) by outlining some salient aspects concerning the type of well-established Form V textbooks on Malaysian history, and (b) by illustration from the themes generally dealt with in the Malaysian history curriculum, political change, administrative development and social development. At the second level I shall deal partly with some problems about writing Malaysian educational history.

The Malaysian History (Form V and Form IV) textbooks

(a) Focus and Structure of Content

The basic structure is topical and sequential, that is the content is arranged in a chronological sequence with each succeeding chapter covering a major topic as well. Primary attention is on what happened and the sequence is faithfully narrated. In the local context where the language of the text is often not the language of the home it can be argued that this structure allows for simplicity and enables the facts and the events more readily in our highly examination-oriented school system. Primary focus is on what happened rather than why it happened. Though there are occasional attempts at bringing into focus the relevance of the past to the present (in particular Ryan's efforts in this connection are noteworthy)² it seems fair to say that future writers need to reorientate the Malaysian history text toward crucial issues and to focus less on the standard descriptive categories like the residential system, federation, decentralization etc. Too much it seems to me has been made out of too little. Instead of the mechanics of British administration more time should be spent on critical features or the balance of forces within the emerging plural society e.g. Race Relations, differences in social-structures, relationships between the mother-country and the immigrant communities, urban-rural incongruities, the imbalance of development, etc.

(b) Analysis and Interpretation

Analysis and Interpretation follow a cause-event-result pattern. In some cases this is well handled, in most it differs little from a straight narrative sequence of events. We look in vain for the preservation of possible alternative explanations for any one sequence, the use of explanatory hypotheses or interpretative propositions. The cause-event-consequence unit is presented as an established fact rather than as an interpretation. Discussion is foreclosed rather than provided. Skills that one can expect from the discipline of history, skills that involve an attitude of probing, questioning, and weighing alternatives are not fostered when a pupil or the reader is presented with only one "correct" version. The problem of assumed finality in the presentation of cause-event-result units that seem to characterize the text books on Malaysian history frequently used in our schools may be illustrated from two citations:³

The cause-event-result unit on the founding of the federation, the Federated Malay States.

Cause: The Residents had become too independent in their own states. They carried out the administration in their own way and by the 1890's the four states were drifting apart. There was a lack of overall control by the Straits Settlements authorities. There was little or no attempt made to co-ordinate policy in the various states or to plan for developments which affected more than one state. The growing power of and lack of control over the Residents had removed much influence from the ruler and the State Councils. The Rulers and the Councils were by-passed by the Residents a likelihood that future co-operation between the states would become extremely difficult.

Event: The Treaty of Federation was agreed to in 1895.

Result: For the first time since the days of the Malacca Sultanate some measure of unity among the central states of the Malay Peninsula was introduced. It was to serve as the nucleus of modern Malaya. An example of this closer association was the Rulers' Conference in 1897.

In an inquiry-oriented approach the writer could hardly ignore the possibility that all these statements were essentially rationalizations after the fact by the one who was to gain most from the foundation of this entity, namely, Frank Swettenham. Also, it would seem illogical if uniformity of British administration were an important rationale for the new "federal" structure, to exclude Penang, Malacca and Singapore. We know from recent research that in fact such a possibility was proposed as a highly desirable development by Swettenham's career rival, William Maxwell. Subsequently Swettenham was appointed Resident General and Maxwell was transferred. With the departure of Maxwell the notion of "merger" disappeared. Thirdly, the argument that the Federated Malay States was to restore influence to the States and even the Sultans could hardly be sustained by the historical evidence and the nature of British control. It is far beyond the scope of our presentation here to discuss the details of this evidence. The remarks above are offered as pointers to the need for a drastic change of approach to the presentation of Malaysian history to our young citizens in the classroom, beginning with a modification of the present tendency of writers to ignore alternative explanations to the cause-event-result sequence.

From another theme, a major component in the history curriculum of the Forms IV and V, the so-called "decentralization controversy" of the 1920s and the 1930s, comes the following extract which is perhaps the best written text material currently in use in this connection (modified to include only the central explanatory statements):⁴

The High Commissioner in 1925 set out proposals for decentralization, proposals which would increase the powers of the state governments and their rulers. He suggested that there should be a gradual handing over of the Chief Secretary's powers to State Councils and Residents. The Sultans supported these proposals as a first step, but opposition came from the European and Chinese business communities. The outcome was a compromise.

In his report (in 1928) the colonial Under Secretary pointed out how practice had fallen short of "the maintenance of the position, authority and prestige of the Malay rulers" which was viewed as a cardinal point of British policy.

In 1931 Sir Clementi revived the question of decentralization. Clementi realized the growing necessity for some kind of co-operation and eventual association between the Federated and Unfederated Malay States. He hoped that later the Straits Settlements would also be included. As individual units they were too small to survive independently in the twentieth century. Malaya was too small a country to have so many independent governments, and unnecessary duplication was expensive and inefficient. Clementi also maintained that it was becoming more essential for the Malay rulers to agree to certain principles of policy, especially with regard to the immigrant races. For the first time the Malay population was clearly outnumbered by the non-Malay population. Clementi wished the government to exercise stricter control over the Chinese who were settled in Malaya.

Essentially, however, Clementi's proposals, when they were made public, were designed to make the Federated States as similar as possible to the Unfederated States, so that the latter would have no objection to closer association. The rulers of the Unfederated States had no intention of giving up the powers which they possessed at that time in order to become as restricted as the Sultans of the Federated States. Clementi hoped to overcome this objection by increasing the powers of the rulers of the Federated States. In 1932 the Colonial Under Secretary reported that politically decentralization was essential. The principle of indirect rule should be safeguarded in order to prevent the Malays being submerged by Western ideas and by the immigrant communities. It was again stressed that the maintenance of the position of the Malay rulers and their authority and prestige must be cardinal points of British policy.

For an inquiry-oriented teacher there is much scope in the above statements as starting points for explanatory propositions. The statements however again stop short of considering possible alternatives or to bring into focus the reality of British power. Is it not a reality that there was no question at all about the possibility of forcing the federal organization through if the British Government had so desired? If this is so an inquiry-oriented writer could hardly ignore some attempt at presenting a plausible answer to that question in his explanations. Secondly, the above text is possibly the only one of the most frequently

used texts which points very clearly to an important dimension of this controversy, the notion of Malay precedence. It remains regrettable that neither its relevance to a crucial Malaysian issue of the present nor its potential for inquiry was given the weight that it warrants. Thirdly, the statement, "The principle of indirect rule should be safeguarded in order to prevent the Malays being submerged by Western ideas and by the immigrant communities." Logically the connection seems doubtful. How did prevention of the Malays from Western modernization help them compete with the immigrant races? Let me reiterate, the above remarks are offered merely to suggest the need for a more open approach to the presentation of statements purporting to represent cause-effect relationships, a more interpretative questioning frame of reference than the implied air of finality that often spoils and distorts passages in texts such as the one above which are stylistically and organizationally not without merit.

It would be proper at this point to consider the constraints that textbook writers work under, for instance, the requirement that the cost of the book be kept within the market range and the need to cover a set number of topics determined by authorities who may be quite unaware of their relevance to the learning process. It would therefore be unlikely that the text-book writer alone can overcome these obstacles, convinced though he may become of the need for reorientating his material to tap the potential of history as a discipline to foster the skills for reasoned inquiry, or reasoned disagreement and not to encourage simplistic or worst still dogmatic assertions. It is likely that a solution may have to come not from the restricted textbook writer but rather from another as yet untapped source, the participation of teachers of history in the preparation of component "units" or "packages" which could be made available to schools as side to the normal teaching task ordinarily geared to the one basic text.

This consideration leads me now to my final task in this paper, to bring into focus some of the problems that are likely to confront those who may want to try their hand at converting historical data (most of which are in the form of documents) into reasonable expositions of modern Malaysian history. I would confine myself to some of the problems related to my current work on the prewar educational history of the Federated Malay States.

It has been said that a historian if he is not to be classified as a mere compiler of chronicles would need some theoretical frame of reference. Theory in more concrete terms, relates to the nature of the research problem and what constructs are necessary for its solution.

The four-language pre-war Malayan system of education and its subsequent growth is viewed as part cause and part effect of the plurality of Malaysian society.

Furnivall defined "plural society" as a unit of disparate parts which owes its existence to external factors, and lacks a common will.

This perception was based in large part on his observation (published in his 1948 study, *Colonial Policy and Practice*) that there was in the Malay States and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, "groups of differing race and culture living side by side in economic symbiosis and mutual avoidance."⁵ Many sociologists and anthropologists have rejected Furnivall's construct. They argue within the tradition of Durkheim and Weber, that social order depended not upon external force but upon internalised normative consensus.⁶ In their views Furnivall erroneously stressed the notion of force as the basis for social order in the plural society. Combining Furnivall's "plural society" construct and Durkheim's "consensus" construct the following hypothesis may be stated: "the development of a pluralistic education system reinforcing segmental values effectively decreased the possibility for the emergence of normative consensus as a basis for social order in the Federated Malay States. To that extent it increased the need for external force."

Leaving theory aside let me now refer briefly to two other problems, the quantity and the quality of the primary data. British educational policy fostered the development of a four-language school system. English, Malay, Chinese and Tamil schools reinforced ethnic and cultural divisions or cleavages. Rural and urban differences were also accentuated with the English schools serving predominantly urban populations and the Malay schools serving rural populations. At the same time, however, cognisance must be given to the potential of the English schools to produce Durkheim's "normative consensus" base for social order. The documentary evidence suggests that a complex configuration of sectors as well as forces rather than any single line of policy brought about the largely divergent trends in educational development in the Federated Malay States. It includes an abiding British-orientalist interest in the Malay language, British experience in India, in particular a reaction to Macaulay's anglicization policy in the late nineteenth century, a symbolic relationship between the British Government and the Malay Rulers, the relatively high costs of English schools compared with the other types of schools, *modus vivendi* arrangements between the Chinese community and the British Government with respect to Chinese education and other social provisions for that community (then perceived as an essentially transient community) and the pressing need for Indian labour to work on the rubber plantations.

Keeping in view the above statement of possible findings it becomes apparent that the necessary primary data will have to be gleaned from a variety of sources, education reports, files of correspondence, minute papers, council proceedings, statistical returns, school magazines, newspapers etc., involving some competence in at least three languages. More pertinent to our present purpose however are the following considerations. To be sure, official reports alone will form a substantial quantity of primary data. Its quality, that is, its usability remains doubtful. The "official" data too often only the surface of the really crucial questions the researcher wants answered. Official reports have a way of becoming routinized into a format and a pattern

giving the researcher little information apart from statistical returns. Too often official comments on any single theme critical to the researcher are few and far between. Faced with such a problem the researcher may find his solution through inference from the reported official actions. He may also infer from the occasional "treasure pieces" of succinct but all too brief marginal or substantive comments in the official corpus. Thirdly he may take the longer route of checking out as many as possible the contexts in which officials are likely to address themselves to the important issues of his research. Another aspect of the usability of official data, the critical intervening variable, appears to be the extent of controversy contained in the official corpus that is relevant to the researcher's interests. A case in point is the controversy in connection with legislation for the control of Chinese education in the 1920s. However a single issue can sometimes take away most of the officials' documentation productivity and we are confronted with a single issue blown out of all proportion to its real relevance. The historian is persistently confronted with these two extremes of virtual scarcity on the one hand and overabundance of material on what may turn out to be of only marginal relevance to his major theme. Indeed the problem becomes even more critical when he has to deal with his corpus of "unofficial" data, e.g. newspapers. Leaders' opinions may suggest norms and values of the time, reactions to various policy developments or they may indicate starting points for certain critical changes in policy etc. The perennial problem remains. To what degree are these opinions representative of the population one is studying?

To conclude let me give you one final illustration from some data that I have recently worked on. The relationship between education and social change in the Federated Malay States may be viewed from three vantage points: (a) an evolving Malay perception of their prior right to government employment, a result partly of repeated British expressions of moral obligation to the Malay Rulers, (b) a growing identification of governmental positions as prestigious and as the channel for social mobility for non-aristocratic Malays, (c) the emergence of an English educated administrative elite and with it a perceptible polarization of competing interests between English-educated Malays and non-Malays. These categorized points of view could, I think, be justified through the normal method of historical documentation. Yet agonizing questions remain. Has the historian been unduly influenced consciously or unconsciously by the issues of the present in his categorizations? Has he understood accurately the cultural backgrounds of the population he writes about? Has his findings overemphasized selected documents? The history writer has constantly to remind himself of questions of this kind, not in the hope of finding final answers but in order that his role as "inquirer" may be fulfilled, knowing full well that historians of another period will find the blinkers that he has missed.

Footnotes

1. Cochran, Thomas C. *The Inner Revolution Essays on the Social Sciences in History*.
Harper and Row, New York 1964.
2. Ryan, N. J. *The Making of Modern Malaya*.
Oxford University Press, 1963.
3. Ibid. pp 131 — 134.
4. Ibid. pp. 151 — 157.
5. Furnivall, J. S. *Colonial Policy and Practice*.
New York University Press, New York, 1956.
6. Smith, M. G. *The Plural Society in the British West Indies*.
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1965.

THE WRITING OF MALAYSIAN HISTORY

DR. J. KATHIRITHAMBY-WELLS

The title of today's discussion has in its popular context become hackneyed. To many it may convey little meaning other than the violent debates which have reigned particularly in the last ten years amongst scholars of Southeast Asian history, over the relative merits of Asian and European sources and the problems of interpretation and orientation. It is not my intention today to reinforce or demolish the Euro-centric versus the Asian-centric or Malaysian-centric view-points. The 'iconoclastic fury'—to borrow a phrase of the Indonesian law historian and poet, Reisink—was a necessary prelude to setting the mood for historical creativity. Fresh modelling must now follow and should be achieved with maximum skill and total vision. However, in direct antithesis to the dynamic challenge which confronts the Malaysian historian, his own response in terms of actual productivity is minimal—his progress constantly impeded and frustrated by what is loosely described as 'the lack of available date.' What is implied here is not necessarily a dearth of indigenous and other sources. More often, the problem in more concrete terms falls into two categories:

1. The lack of training in the required languages
2. The lack of sufficient support from related disciplines like philology, archaeology, anthropology and law, to name a few

If treated seriously, the first problem—that of lack of training in languages, could be alleviated in the future by greater stress on languages in undergraduate training and rigorous post-graduate programmes. The second problem, however, is much more difficult to solve and even if definite goals are set towards training more people in the specialized disciplines, these may only be achieved over a long period of time. The need is, nonetheless, very real and is the only means whereby sound and satisfactory results can be attained in historical research, particularly for pre-19th century Malaysia.

From sources, we proceed to the second stage of history writing: the interpretation of sources. The problem here is particularly serious with indigenous sources which often have been dismissed cursorily as unhistorical and inaccurate. It is important here to concede that our own view of history which essentially is a scientific one, based on facts and accurate records of events, is totally different from that of the earlier generation of people in Nusantara, as is testified in the many *babads*, *sejarahs* and *salasilahs*. These works are a mixture of facts, legends and fantasies where the prime aim, usually, was to glorify a realm or ruler with magical and legendary attributes so as to evoke awe and appreciation in the audience or group. To this end facts and accuracy were often sacrificed. Nevertheless, if we take a look at research in Javanese history, scholars such as Krom, Berg, De Graff and Djajadiningrat have demonstrated that early literary works, even if they cannot be regarded as history in the modern sense, are useful particularly for information on socio-cultural aspects. As one author on Malay sources encouragingly assures:¹

I do not myself think it is a matter for regret that Malay historical writing errs on the side of gossip rather than chronology. The important dates, generally speaking, can be established by other means — by archaeological evidence or from foreign sources. The kind of material not so found is exactly that characteristic of Malay historiography — social material, detailed physical descriptions of places and things, implicit revelations of group attitudes and conflicts. If carefully checked and evaluated (as inspiringly illustrated, in the case of mainly non-Malay sources, in the works of van Leur and Schrieke), this material helps more than anything else to answer the questions of modern historical research, which is rightly more concerned with social, economic, and conceptual backgrounds than the simple chronology of political events.

The same could be said for the *undang2*, *adat* and maritime laws which if codified and annotated, would serve not only as primary sources but also provide important clues for historical interpretation. In the interpretation of treaties between European and Asian powers for instance, thus far the balance has weighed heavily in favour of the former, due not so much to bias as to ignorance of the conceptual framework of law and treaty-making in the local regions. Reciprocal obligations on the part of the contracting parties have often been misunderstood. Complaints amongst European powers of non-compliance and outright violation of treaties by local powers were frequent enough to leave a general impression that Asian potentates and rulers were by nature dishonest knaves. But as one author observed, "... in a world of frequently unrecorded *adat* law, *ad hoc* oral agreements will have been more familiar on the whole than written agreements which required faith and confidence in one another over a long period of time."² Thus, intra-Indonesian international law functioned where local treaty alliance with European powers often broke down.

Apart from concepts of treaty agreements, those relating to political and commercial control also call for re-interpretation and definition. For example, the nature of reciprocal obligations and the actual degree of control exercised by the former over the latter, have yet to be categorised. Hence we have only a vague idea of the relations which subsisted between the northern Malay States and Siam or, to take an earlier example, between the Malacca Sultanate and its dependencies like Kampar, Siak, Indragiri and Pahang. Only with fuller knowledge of details such as these can the greatness of the Malacca Sultanate as a territorial power be tested, although its commercial supremacy itself may, on conclusive evidence, be accepted as unchallenged and unprecedented in local history. Again, exploring

1. J. C. Bottoms, "Some Malay Historical Sources: A Bibliographical Note," *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, (ed.) Soedjatmoko (New York, 1965) p. 190.
2. G. J. Resink, "Centuries of International Law," *Indonesia's History Between The Myths* (The Hague, 1968) p. 207.

another concept, what were the attributes of power and authority in the Malay world? Does the common impression gathered by writers and travellers that the *istans* of the Malay States were generally a motley collection of palm-thatched huts infer that politics were less significant here than at the more impressive Javanese *Kratons* or the colourful courts of Europe? Not so perhaps to local and regional politics or to the eager western entrepreneurs to whom what happened at the apparently humble courts of the Malay rulers was crucial to European politics and economics.

The search for fresh categories and a clearer definition of concepts would seem a pre-requisite for even the study of 'modern' Malaysian history. For, although one might safely speak of European political forms and judicial structures, the British period, for instance, did not begin to operate effectively till the late 19th Century. It would seem more appropriate and meaningful, therefore, if a time chart were drawn up for the periodization of Malaysian history, independent of the scales which are used for the study, say, of the history of colonial expansion. It is for the same reason that the Dutch sociologist and historian, van Leur, challenged the popular assumption that the advent of the Portuguese marked the beginning of colonial domination in Asia, and argued that it would be more accurate to postpone the Western impact on Indonesia, at least, to the late 17th and early 18th centuries, when the Dutch began to acquire substantial treaty and territorial concessions. It was van Leur's contention that although European enterprise had begun in the 16th Century its impact was limited and left the traditional world, for the most part, intact. The same could be said for the Malay peninsula where, although the Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511, their influence in the region was restricted and Malacca's socio-political tradition continued to flourish under Johore. Even commercially, the Portuguese aim of attaining supremacy was successfully thwarted by local powers like Atjeh and, on the whole, the Malay States and institutions survived in their pristine form on the mainland. If these facts were borne in mind, then with reference to the study of politics in the Malay states, for instance, the absence, often, of definite linear state boundaries would be treated as a positive rather than a negative conclusion. The observation should stimulate the search for alternative concepts of territorial control which, obviously, existed. However, until such time as we shed the psychological burden of treating anything from 1500 to 1600 as colonial history, our vision of Malaysia's historical heritage will continue to remain dim, perplexing and unimpressive.

The task of Malaysian history writing is onerous and cannot be resolved entirely within the confines of debate halls and seminars. It requires, in my view, resources in talent and co-ordination at all levels — national, regional and international. And if positive and dynamic results are to be achieved the task far surpasses the ability of a few earnest individuals or the limited and very dangerously stretched resources of the Department of History at our University.

PROBLEMS IN THE WRITING OF MALAYSIAN HISTORY

A lecture by

PROFESSOR S. ARASARATNAM

Chairman, Sir, Ladies and Gentlemen: By way of a preliminary remark, I would like to say that I am not generally enthusiastic about participating in this sort of exercise. I feel that in the writing of history, as in other things in life, it would be more reasonable to talk less and do more, because if we go on talking about problems of history writing, there will be more people talking about history than actually writing history.

My next preliminary remark is that it is very generous indeed on the part of the organisers of the seminar to invite me to participate in this seminar, knowing very well that I know very little about Southeast Asian history, much less about Malaysian history. However, I expect the organisers and you want me to talk from an outsider's point of view, or rather from a 'fresh' point of view. Fresh not in the sense that it is a new point of view, but in the sense that it is from a 'freshman's' point of view and I would hope that you will lean back in your seats and relax, because history is fun—or rather writing it is fun, though sometimes reading it is not. So, having then thanked the organisers for this bold invitation which they have extended to me I hope that I would bring to bear an open mind on the subject. You will pardon me for any flaws and treat this as an essentially an outsider's point of view.

My first point is that Malaysian history is essentially a part of the whole discipline of history, not a separate autonomous subject of its own. It has to be studied and written as part of that discipline. And in order to be proficient in the writing of Malaysian history, in order to be proficient in the study of Malaysian history, it is very necessary that you be proficient in history in general. This has been recognised in our three schools of history in the three Universities in this country in all of which History has been established as a discipline in its own right. And only when the students and the prospective researchers are instructed thoroughly in the discipline of history, its methodology and techniques, then only will you be prepared for the production of more and more original literature on Malaysian history.

The discipline of history has in recent times, as have other disciplines, undergone many changes. Though human history itself has had a widely ramifying and diversified course of development and for convenience we split it up into different areas like English History, Malaysian History, Indonesian History and so on, it is very necessary to remember always that in fact history is an interconnected network; and the more a student and the prospective researcher is exposed to as many areas of history as possible, will he become a better historian of

his own area. So the prospective historian — the Malaysian historian — must start by being a good historian. A good historian will produce good Malaysian history.

Another point I would like to make is that it is therefore necessary to be proficient in the new developments in the progress of history. It is necessary to see what are the new techniques, what are the new methods that are being followed in the writing of history of the other parts of the world, which have a more developed historiography than our own. These writings will show some of the development and we can see to what extent they are suitable to Malaysian history. First of all, it seems to me that the writing of history or research on history in various societies proceeds or could proceed on either of two methods. Firstly, there is the micro study, and secondly the macro study. The micro study is one in which a situation is studied in miniature, — is studied under a microscope. It is identified, separated and isolated and studied in all its details. It could be the isolation of an interest in history, it could be the isolation of a small area or a kampong, it could be the isolation of a family of princely, noble, merchant or peasant origins. The point is that it is a specific situation in miniature put under a microscope, enlarged and looked at it from all points of view. Great advances have been made a small area or a kampong, it could be the isolation of a family of princely, noble merchant or peasant origins. The point is that it is a specific situation in miniature put under a microscope, enlarged and looked at it from all points of view. Great advances have been made in this technique in the writing of history in other parts of the world. Specifically, I may refer to a project in France where there is a systematic study of the villages, districts and towns in the prefectures of France which had been undertaken from the early 20th Century onwards. Likewise in England, there is a specific project for study of the history of English Countries which is run by the Institute of Historical Research in London. On a similar plane is the monumental history of Parliament from its earliest beginnings to the present day looked at from the point of view of the biography of each individual member of Parliament. A student takes one member of Parliament and studies him in detail and in this way the composition of Parliament at different periods is put together. It is a good training for a student who is beginning to do his research in history. This I recommend as a good methodology for our Master's candidates and even for those who are doing research for a Ph.D. A series of monographs which are written in this way will then show that Malaysian history is on the march. We can do this quite feasibly because every kampong is an isolated entity and even states have lived in isolation for sometime in history, and we can distinguish between mercantile communities and landed aristocracy. All these factors make possible and give wide scope for the practice for this sort of micro history.

Next is the second in this two-pronged attack of the historian that implies the use of somewhat more sophisticated techniques. One come to this only at the relatively more advanced stage of historical

research, nevertheless it is necessary in the progress of a country's historiography. We must, if we are to write good Malaysian history, follow this sort of study also. This is a study in which longer periods are taken and studied with the advantage of historical perspective. Neglected themes may be taken up like for example the history of states, or the history of maritime trade or the history of land-tenure problems; changes are identified, periods are demarcated and in this way one gets a perspective study of themes in Malaysian history.

The weakness of existing Malaysian history is the relative lack of this sort of writing. I believe that we must attempt this sort of study to look at a long term development over a few centuries as a continuum which in turn will set off a chain reaction from some who break down this hypothesis and others who confirm it and so on.

My next point is related to the relationship between the social sciences and history. This is an area perhaps in which modern historiography has made the greatest advances. The traditional barrier between a social scientist and a historian is gradually breaking down in the western world, particularly in American historiography, and to some extent European and British historiography. Historians are now beginning to use very fruitfully in their craft the techniques of the social scientist, more specially those of the sociologists or the anthropologists. Perhaps the last mentioned is more related to us. Both the sociologists and anthropologists have a definite body of theory and concepts of social institutions and of social behaviour. They have constructed models of such behaviour. Now the historian can test these against the background of the facts that he has collected. He will find these hypotheses useful in interpreting meaningfully a complicated jumble of facts. Very often we find that the historian has such a lot of facts and materials that he simply cannot make anything out of them and it appears to me that if he can sit back, and think of some models related to his subject of study, and use this to test these facts that he had collected, then perhaps he can come up with some kind of a meaningful way of interpreting this mass of facts. I can give an example in Indian history, where this technique has been applied with a tremendous amount of success by a new group of historians. The phenomenon of the caste institution has been a puzzle to the social historian from the time that he has started his research. But now with so many anthropological micro studies of the institution of caste at village level in various parts of India, now that these are available to the historian, he can with the use of the flash-back technique, make some very useful generalisations or at least have a somewhat clearer picture of how caste operated in a historical dimension. Thus this technique is applicable to Malaysian historiography as well. And in the study of kinship systems, for example, a study of inheritance and land ownership pattern, a study of a tenurial obligations in a particular village, a knowledge of the contemporary situation may shed considerable light on the historical evolution of society. This is true of relatively unchanging societies such as in India and to a less extent in Malaysia. We have a great

deal to learn from the anthropologist because he has studied and exposed contemporary Malaysian society in detail, and we, I think, can make use of this knowledge to throw this light backward to the past,— read history backward. It may be a faulty technique but in the absence of other techniques, this may be our only means to say something about the past. I have an example here of the feasibility of this methodology to Malaysian history. Very recently one of our Ph.D candidates who has completed a thesis, presented a paper before our Graduate Seminar; there I thought he gave a very striking example of this particular methodology I am speaking about. Here he was an archaeologist-cum-anthropologist who was studying contemporary 'Orang Asli' communities. He lived and studied among them, he observed them as a participant—observer and then he coupled this information with archaeological artifacts which he picked up from these places. The result was that he gave us a fine hypothesis on the pattern of trade between the orang asli and the outside world. It may prove unacceptable to the historian but it is for the time being a meaningful construct of the economic relations of the 'Orang Asli' communities with the surrounding villages. And this has enabled the development of an interesting hypotheses on Malaysian economic history to be worked out subsequently by other historians. A similar work which perhaps some of you have seen and is just published is R. K. Jain's: *Indians of the Plantation Frontiers*. This is another example of a good anthropologist, having studied not more than a few plantations has given us some interesting light on Indian social behaviour which historians could not perceive because of their reliance on traditional and conventional methods. Similarly, I think, other social sciences like political science, for example, can be brought into the service of history if we set about this in the proper way.

Yet another of the social sciences which can be brought in, is the new economic history. The new economic history as I see it is the application of accepted economic theories to past economic experiences. Here again with the use of this technique, some considerable advances had been made in Western economic history. In fact there is an extreme school of practitioners of this sort of economic history which has begun to quantify everything and whose books contain more numerical data than literature. Without going so far as to the extreme position of quantifying all our data, and without accepting all the methodology of the new economic history, I feel we can apply, again as in the case of sociology, some of its techniques to our study of Malaysian history. We can use this especially in the modern period, where we have data, such as for example on the trade of 19th and 20th Centuries in Penang and Singapore. These statistics can be put into the computer and proper questions asked. Remember that computers can provide informations only for the questions you ask of it. There must be a man behind the computer, and this of course must be the historian. We can use these statistics to test our various economic theories, now that there is a large body of economic theory on developing societies and on economically backward societies. Thus, our study becomes inter-disciplinary which again as was stressed by Dr. Philip Loh is very

necessary for Malaysian history. Of course this is important for all history, but especially more so for modern Malaysian history. Why? The reason is that in case of Malaysian history where we are confronted with a special set of difficulties such as the paucity of the usual material that a historian relies on, the lack of extensive archaeological remains, the absence of many primary sources, the relative weakness of our historical tradition, the interdisciplinary approach becomes particularly relevant. The cross-fertilisation of disciplines provides new insights. An extreme example of this is African history—South Saharan Africa where they face the problems that we face in far more extreme ways. The absence of a literary tradition in many of their languages means that there are absolutely no written records and archaeological artifacts are even fewer than we have here. So there is absolutely no evidence for a historian to begin his study, and in this context therefore, it is the anthropologists who are the historians. There is no distinction between the historian and the anthropologist. So a similar form of an inter-disciplinary approach on the problems of Malaysian history is highly essential in our country.

Let me turn to another problem in Malaysian history, a different sort of problem, and this is a problem I have been faced with as a student of Malaysian history. When I started reading Malaysian history late in life I noted the absence of a framework for Malaysian history. This absence is an obstacle to its understanding. We may be studying about various incidents, e.g. the rise and fall of Srivijaya or of the Sultanate of Malacca and so on, but where does all this fit into? The pieces simply do not fit, and this is not what I mean by history. Except for the last phase of history of the 19th and 20th Centuries where you have the concepts of colonialism and decolonisation, except for these criteria which are meaningful, the pre-1800 A.D. Malaysian history was to me at least, a disjointed jumble. And in Malaysian history as in other history there must be continuity. Now what is the key to this? This we have not yet perceived. And I think that as long as we do not have this then so long will Malaysian history be disjointed. I hope you have found South Asian history interesting because here we have some kind of a central plot as it were. In South Asian history despite the fact that there are many dynasties, many wars and dates, kings and queens, we have a concept, a concept of centrifugalism and centripetalism. We know that from say 1500 B.C. onwards, Indian history moved in this way towards the centre, towards the formation of empires and then break-off from the centre and the formation of various little kingdoms, again the movement towards the centre and again disintegration. And perhaps Chinese history also moves in this way. Yet another example of a scheme or a framework enabling the understanding of history is European history. European history has had a long tradition of historiography and historians have a continuing scheme. They have a concept of movement from a primitive political system to slave based empires of Greece and Rome, feudalism, capitalism and so on. The point is not that these are acceptable constructs, not whether actually history happened this way. That is

not so much an important question, as to whether there is something for the mind to cling on to, whether there is something satisfying which will enable us to understand history. In fact as far as I know there is only one historian (or historical geographer) who has attempted this — Paul Wheatley — not in his *Golden Kheronese* but in his "Impressions of the Malay Peninsula". Here he comes near to offering us such a framework of Malaysian history. I was looking at his categories and though I find them still not particularly logical, not particularly coherent, nevertheless they are there. He speaks first of the Dong Son culture, the extension of the Dong Son culture into the peninsula, then he speaks of the Hindu and Buddhist culture, Indianisation period during which they have Funan civilization, and then they have the period which has been strangely called "home of the strange and the precious". I do not know what he means by this and then there is the period of the city states and Srivijaya domination and Srivijaya downfall; and then there was the Majapahit followed by the Malaccan century. This is the sort of thing I mean. Something which shows how one period or one dominating theme moves into another — why did it move? And into what does it move? Of course Wheatley does not answer these questions satisfactorily.

In this context I would like to refer to Marx who has in a way had a wide impact upon, more specifically, Western history but also upon Asian history. Marx, was responsible for this scheme of progress for Western history. Of course he tried to apply it to world history but really it was related to Western history. And as a result of this, to generations of scholars who because they wanted to bash Marx on the head or because they wanted to prove that Marx was right, this has been the cause of the progress of historiography of the West. And even today historians divide themselves into Marxists and anti-Marxists and fight furiously but we in the middle are happy because they are all writing history and we can read it and enjoy it.

I think that what Malaysian history needs above all is a Karl Marx. More so, because once a Marx is produced some may bash him on the head and others can rise up in his defence. The point that I am trying to drive at is that once we have such a construct, than perhaps we can move on by attacking that construct or by putting something more feasible in its place. Such constructs always have a catalytic effect — they trigger off a thought process for further research because there are people who wants to disprove this and produce their own hypothesis — and after all as a famous historian has said history is the substitution of one hypothesis for another. I was speaking about the influence of Marx on European history but of late I find that there is a generation of scholars in Asian countries who are using the methodology of Marx to look at Asian history. As I see it Asian history was perhaps the weakest link in Marxist methodological chain. He talked of an Asian type of production but without actually defining what he means by it. But I find that particularly the post war historians in Japan, are using the Marxist interpretation as a tool in their historical investigations. I find that they have first of all started looking at their own economic history, particularly the pre-Meiji and

not into other Asian countries which they are beginning to explain meaningfully in terms of Marxist methodology. And likewise, now I find they are extending into other Asian histories like South Asian history, and even South East Asian history and using the same methodology to high-light some of these happenings in the economic sphere in these countries. I think that our own historians should follow in their footsteps. Our own historian should look at *Das Kapital*, should look at the writings of Marx on pre-industrial society on the causes for the non-development of capitalism in India for instance—the non-development of capitalism in China as contrasted with its development in Western societies. I think the reading of Marx will give us some ideas with which to look at pre-modern Malaysian history.

Finally I want to tackle somewhat discreetly a problem of interpretation. Of course it is true, it is a common place truism, that each age writes its own history; all history is contemporary history and many other quotations which all of you are familiar with. Each age writes about what it wants to know from the past, looks at it through its own eyes, interprets it in its own way. There is thus a continuing process of interpretation and reinterpretation going on. We ourselves cannot escape from this process. Therefore it is a right and necessary thing that we are doing in this stage of our development to seek to reinterpret our history. But I would like to state here a word of caution; it is alright for an age to write its own history, but in doing this it must see to it that the past is not subject to the present—that the past does not become the slave of the present. History has no lessons to teach. A historian writes history and then allows the statesmen, the politician and propogandist to draw their own lessons from it. But history itself does not teach any lessons. History as past happenings, is independent of the present—it is done, it is gone, it is finished. Its independence and its autonomy must be respected. This is what Ranke meant when he said that every age is immediate to God. In the sense that it belongs to God, it is inviolable. You just cannot use it for your own ends at this stage. It also gives our history a certain dynamism. An interpretation of today may and perhaps will be rejected tomorrow. And this perhaps will give our historian a sense of humility when they are debunking historians of an earlier age, they will at least be humble, that there will come somebody else who will debunk them as sure as night follows day.

Let me sum up these thoughts. I feel that Malaysian history is an essential part of the discipline of history, must be open and receptive to the new extensions in the methodology of this discipline. It must be open, it must be receptive to new frontiers in the study of other disciplines. We must open our windows to allow fresh winds to blow into the corridors of traditional historiography. And we must place our work at the disposal of these adherents of other disciplines who by acceptance or by criticism will enrich our own findings. In this way not only does the historian acquire new tools and techniques in his research but also gets new insights by comparing and contrasting his own material with the findings of others. Malaysian history must advance with the discipline of history.

“ADA-KAH MALAYSIA MEMPUNYAI GERAKAN KEBANGSAAN?”

CHEAH BOON KHENG

Sa-belum saya mula membentangkan kertas kerja saya, biar-lah saya menjelaskan sedikit tentang taraf saya dalam forum malam ini. Saya berdiri disini bukan sabagai wakil suratkhbar Straits Times, tetapi hanya sabagai wartawan dan penuntut sejarah. Ini sebab bukan dasar Straits Times untok menghantar kakitangan-nya mengambil bahagian dalam forum, walau bagaimana pun saya tidak mahu dianggap sabagai s-orang juruchapak Straits Times.

Dan sekarang, mengenai tajok forma malam ini, ia terbentok dalam satu soalan “Ada-kah Malaysia mempunyai Gerakan Kebangsaan?”. Jawapan saya kepada soalan itu: Ia, Malaysia pernah ada gerakan kebangsaan. Daripada zaman dahulu bila Kerajaan Malacca Lama jatuh ke-tangan Portuguis dalam abad ke-16, sudah timbul semangat kebangsaan untok menentang penjajahan. Tetapi sebab saya rasa tidak chukup masa untok perbincangan pada malam ini, tinjaun kami nampak-nya akan terbatas kepada gerakan nasionalis moden saja dalam masa sabelum atau selapas Perang Dunia Kedua.

Apa-kah maksud istilah ‘nationalisma’ yang akan saya gunakan? Mula2 istilah ini bermaana satu chorak, termasuk perasaan bahasa, bangsa, kebudayaan, dan konsep ‘negara’ atau ‘nation-state’ dan juga kewarganegaraan (nationality). Pergertian istilah ini timbul daripada Eropah. Dalam abad ke19, beberapa negara Eropah baru munchul sabagai peninggalan kerajaan Empire Napoleon. Mereka berasas atas bangsa dan bahasa, dan ada juga berasas atas hak2 keazaman negeri untok menentukan diri mereka sendiri. Saya merujuk buku2 saperti: *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, Hans Kohn, Van Nostrand 1965; dan *Nationalism*, Elie Kedourie, Hutchinsons, 1961. Faktor2 lain boleh juga menjelaskan kemunchulan gerakan nasionalis. (Di negeri2 baru Asia akar2 nationalisma di-jumpai dalam keadaan tekanan2 ekonomi yang baru munchul dalam masa penjajahan, yang memecahkan oder masharakat tradisi, yang menggalakan kemunchulan gulongan2 ekonomi baru (new economic classes) dan mencheptakan proses memodenkan masharakat tersebut. Satu alasan untok penelasan perubahan ini diberi oleh John H. Kautsky,¹ seorang ahli sejarah. Dalam analisa-nya gulongan2 baru yang terdiri daripada masharakat itu ia-lah yang pertama, gulongan atasan atau bangsawan yang moden tetapi terpenchil dan terbatas; yang kedua, gulongan menengah, termasuk kaum cherdik pandai berpelajaran barat, peniaga2, pekerja2 dalam suwasta; dan ketiga, kaum petani yang telah mengalami ke-burokkan eckonomi. Gulongan ketiga2 ini, kata beliau, terutama kaum cherdik pandai, boleh memainkan peranan penting dalam gerakan nasionalis. Ini sebab mereka menjadi pelopor2 atau baris depan (vanguard) untok mencheptakan proses memodenkan masharakat mereka dan mereka menjadi anasir2 atau agen2 proses ini. Gulongan2

baru ini menuntut hak2 politik, kebebasan, keadilan, supaya mereka boleh dapat memainkan peranan2 penting dalam pemerintahan. Tetapi tuntutan2 mereka di-tolak oleh penjajah2, dan ini menyebabkan mereka berjuang untuk menentang penjajahan, dan menuntut kemerdekaan supaya mereka jadi pemimpin2.

Di Negeri Malaya sa-lepas Perang Dunia Kedua faktor2 yang di-sebut oleh Hans Kohn, Elie Kedourie dan John Kautsky semua di-jumpai, tetapi apa yang mengelirukan keadaan politik pada masa itu ia-lah masyarakat-nya masyarakat majmuk atau 'plural society'. Dan ini menimbulkan beberapa masa'alah. Masyarakat itu mempunyai beberapa aliran nasionalisma bergerak selaras atau sebelah menyebelah. Ada aliran nasionalis yang berorientasi kepada Indonesia seperti KMM, API dan Parti Kebangsaan Melayu. Ada juga yang orientasi-nya kepada tradisi lama dari masa kejatuhan Kerajaan Melaka Lama, dan aliran ini di-ketuai oleh ahli2 bangsawan serta diwakili oleh Persatuan2 Melayu dan UMNO. Kedua2 aliran ini muncul dikalangan orang2 Melayu. Aliran yang ketiga muncul di-kalangan orang2 India dalam bentuk seperti MIC yang berorientasi kepada gerakan nasionalis di-negeri India, dimana Parti Kongres dianggap sebagai parti nasionalis teragong. Aliran ke-empat dan kelima muncul dikalangan orang2 China. Ada satu aliran berkiblat kepada negeri China, dimana berlaku pada masa itu perang saudara, antara pihak Kuomintang dengan Kominis. Di Malaya perang saudara itu dilanjutkan oleh banyak orang China dalam chabang2 kedua parti ini. Tetapi aliran kelima berbedza daripada aliran ini sebab ia muncul daripada kaum China yang telah bermastautin beberapa kurun di Negri2 selat (Straits Settlements) dimana pemerintahan penjajah sa-chara langsung telah dijalankan terus. Mereka menganggap negeri Malaya sabagai negeri mereka dan bersedia memberi taat setia kepada-nya, dan mereka muncul dalam parti Kesatuan Demokratik Malaya (atau MDU).

Semua orang daripada tiap2-aliran tersebut bersama2 mengalami pemerintahan penjajahan, dan ini boleh menjadikan satu faktor untuk menyatupadukan mereka. Tetapi mereka saling terpisah diantara satu sama lain dibawah dasar penjajah "belah dan memerintah" kecuali parti MDU yang bersetuju untuk bekerjasama dengan PUTERA, satu gabungan yang mengandungi 60 badan Melayu, terutama badan2 persuratan dan kebudayaan, di-pimpin oleh Parti Kebangsaan Melayu. Pakatan mereka dikenal sabagai PUTERA-AMCJA. Termasuk dalam pakatan ini ialah MIC, badan2 sayap kiri seperti kesatuan2 buruh, badan wanita dan badan2 bekas gerila2 yang menentang Jepun.

Dasar penjajah yang menyebabkan semua aliran tidak bersatu ialah chadangan Malayan Union yang dibawa oleh wakil Kerajaan Inggeris Istimewa, Sir Harold MacMichael. Mengikut chadangan Sultan2 dipaksa menyerahkan kuasa mereka ketangan penjajah Inggeris. Chadangan ini juga ingin memberi hak2 politik, seperti kewarganegaraan kepada orang2 bukan Melayu, untuk membalas budi jasa2 mereka dalam peperangan Dunia Kedua bila mereka menentang Jepun. Chadangan ini di-buat sebab orang2 Melayu tidak di-perchayai oleh

pemerintah2 Ingeris kerana ada beberapa golongan2 mereka bekerja sama dengan pehak Jepun. Walau bagaimana pun, chadangan Malayan Union mendorong orang2 Melayu bersatu untuk membela dan menyelamatkan hak2 dan kepentingan mereka. Aneh-nya chadangan Malayan Union yang dibuat untuk menguntongkan orang2 bukan Melayu tidak dapat sokongan sabulat daripada orang2 bukan Melayu itu sendiri, terutama orang2 China. Sebab utama ialah pulau Singapura dibawah chadangan itu dipisahkan samula, saperti yang ada di-mana Straits Settlements dan disana pemerintahan Ingeris dijalan-kan langsung. Dibawah Malayan Union negeri2 Melayu bersama2 negeri Melaka dan Pulau Pinang di-satukan buat kali pertama. Gerakan nasionalis yang muncul sekarang dibawah pimpinan Dato Onn dan UMNO dapat sokongan kuat daripada rakyat Melayu. Di-kalangan kaum2 lain tidak ada apa2 kegiatan. Mereka terpaksa membangun dan muncul di dunia politik Malaya bila pehak penjajah mengakui salah dan silap faham mereka mengenai aspirasi2 orang2 Melayu yang nampak-nya bijak, chekap dan dinamis. Pehak panjajah sekarang ingin membuat satu rancangan perlembagaan dengan pehak UMNO, untuk memberi satu tolak ansor kepada UMNO. Ini mengejutkan orang2 bukan Melayu dan juga orang2 Melayu yang beraliran sayap kiri, dan yang dipengarohi oleh pemimpin2 revolusioner Indonesia saperti Sukarno dan Tan Malaka. Itu sebab mereka menentan UMNO. Dan inilah menyebabkan mereka bersatu dalam satu pakatan yang dikenal AMCJA-PUTERA.

Kita lihat semangat nasionalisma orang2 Melayu telah timbul bila mereka menentang Perjanjian MacMichael (atau MacMichael Treaty). Orang2 Melayu masa itu benchikan penjajah2 Ingeris sebab mereka rasa di-tipu dan hak2 politik mereka di-rampas dan di-bagikan kepada orang2 bukan Melayu. Gerakan nasionalis orang2 Melayu yang di-pimpin oleh Dato Onn dan UMNO berjaya memaksa pehak Ingeris berunding dengan nya, bukan dengan AMCJA — PUTERA. Bila chadangan baru politik British di-bentangkan dalam bentuk Persekutuan Tanah Melayu pada tahun 1948, misal-nya, UMNO telah menchapai matlamat-nya. Hak2 politik orang2 Melayu terutama kedaulatan raja2 dan ugama Islam, di-perkokoh dalam atoran baru ini.

Tetapi lihat: pada masa ini pehak UMNO belum menuntut kemerdekaan daripada penjajah2 Ingeris, tetapi jalan-nya sudah terang. Matlamat itu akan di-chapai dengan chara perlahan, beransor2.

Pada ketika yang sama perang saudara dinegeri China hampir-tamat, dan pehak Kominis dinegeri China jelas akan berjaya merampas kuasa dan mengambil alih pemerintahan China. Pehak Kominis di Malaya memberontak.

Sebab2 pemberontakan-nya banyak, tetapi yang utama, pada pendapat saya, ialah penindasan pehak pemerintahan Ingeris atas kesatuan2 buroh di ladang2 getah dan lombong2 timah, dimana kegiatan2 Kominis berlaku dengan hebat sekali. Sabuah buku yang baru2 di-terbitkan oleh saorang pakar Australia yang mengkaji

masaalah kesatuan2 buruh pada masa itu,² berkata pehak Kominis tidak bersedia untuk memberontak, tetapi terpaksa memberontak olah kesatuan2 buroh.

Walau bagaimana pun, pada pendapat saya, bila dharurat di-umumkan pada bulan June tahun 1948, ia telah menetapkan kedudukan UMNO sabagai parti nasionalis yang tunggal, Kesatuan Demokratik Malaya dan Parti Kebangsaan Melayu telah di-bubarkan, dan banyak ahli2-nya bergerak dibawah tanah (underground).

Bagaimana padang^{pendapat} saya mengenai peranan yang di-mainkan oleh AMCJA — PUTERA? Mereka merupakan satu pilihan lain antara dua, tetapi mereka gagal. Apa-kah sebab2 kegagalan mereka? Sebab yang pertama ialah mereka tidak dapat bekerja sama dengan UMNO. Mula2 Parti Kebangsaan Melayu bersukutu dengan UMNO tetapi kemudian ia menarek diri-nya dari pakatan ini. Satu perkara lain ialah pimpinan PKM tidak boleh bersetuju dengan pimpinan UMNO. Pimpinan UMNO yang berkaitan dengan gulongan feudal itu, bimbang pengaruh Indonesia yang anti-feudal, pro-republik di dalam PKM akan jadi anchaman atas kepentingan2 mereka. Ada beberapa sebab lain juga, terutama soal bendera dan tuntutan kemerdekaan. Salepas ini Kesatuan Demokratik Malaya tidak bekerjasama dengan UMNO sebab ia memandang UMNO sa-bagai satu parti perkauman dan ini tidak boleh menjadi asas untuk mereka bersatu. MCP juga tidak mengakui bahawa ia tidak boleh mencapai matlamat-nya kalau tidak mendapat sokongan rakyat orang2 Melayu.

Matlamat2 AMCJA — PUTERA sungguh baik. Mereka bersetuju bahwa Malaya mesti di-beri kemerdekaan, bahasa Melayu dijadikan bahasa kebangsaan, kedaulatan raja2 Melayu dihormati dan satu kewarganegaraan (atau nationality) bernama Melayu diberi kepada semua orang tak kira, Melayu atau bukan Melayu, asalkan mereka sudah bermastautin lima tahun di negeri ini. Banyak tuntutan yang dibuat oleh PUTERA — AMCJA sekarang telah di-laksanakan. Dan saya rasa kalau mereka berjaya kewarganegaraan Melayu yang di-chadangkan mereka tentu dilaksanakan. Banyak ahli2 sejarah menganggap Chadangan2 Perlembagaan 1947 mereka (atau Constitutional Proposals) sebagai satu ranchangan politik yang progresif, yang maju. Sebab itu parti Kesatuan Demokratik Malaya yang masuk dalam AMCJA — PUTERA boleh di-anggap sabagai parti nasionalis. Oleh Kerana kedua2 aliran yang progresif ini tidak berjaya, maka UMNO yang berjaya dipaksa oleh penjajah2 Ingerris menchari rakan2 untuk bersekutu dalam golongan comprador-kapitalis. Pesurohjaya Ingerris bagi Asia Tenggara masa itu, Malcolm MacDonald, yang berunding dengan pemimpin UMNO, memaksa UMNO berbuat demikian. Beliau mempunyai banyak kawan baik dari golongan peniaga2 seperti Lee Kong Chian, Tan Cheng Lok dan sabagai-nya. Telah saya nyatakan tadi pemimpin2 dalam UMNO munchul daripada gulongan2 atasan yang banyak berkaitan dengan sistem feudal, seperti Dato Onn, Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang, Tun Razak dan lain2. Walau pun benar pimpinan UMNO berpelajaran Barat dan ingin memodenkan

masyarakat-nya, tetapi mereka boleh di-anggap hanya sebagai "modernising aristocracy", seperti yang di-sifatkan Professor Harry Benda, seorang ahli sejarah.³ Sebab itu mereka menchari rakan2-nya didalam kaum comprador kapitalis, seperti MCA.

Aliran2 lain yang diwakili oleh AMCJA — PUTERA telah dipimpin oleh orang2 yang berasal daripada gulongan2 menengah (middle classes). Juga ahli2 Parti Kebangsaan Melayu, yang banyak belajar di Maktab Perguruan Sultan Idris di Tanjong Malim, boleh dianggap sabagai kaum cherdek pandai yang moden, yang terpelajar tetapi terpisah daripada tradisi mereka. Semua ahli2 Kesatuan Demokratik Melayu berpelajaran Barat. Dalam gulongan mereka ada banyak peguam, guru dan ketua kesatuan buruh yang mewakili kakitangan pejabat dan kerani.

Tetapi sa-lepas pakatan AMCJA — PUTERA gagal, perkembangan politik di Malaya berjalan-lah dengan chara yang di-ketahui sekarang sampai pada hari kemerdekaan. UMNO mula menuntut kemerdekaan hanya pada tahun 1951, tetapi sudah tentu ia akan menchapai matlamat-nya. Kerana hendak menamatkan perjuangan Parti Komunis, pehak Inggris menyerahkan kuasa dan pemerentahan kepada UMNO dan rakan2 baru-nya, seperti MCA dan MIC, yang munchul bersama2 dalam bentuk Parti Perikatan.

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SATU ASPEK PERGERAKAN NASIONALISMA DI MALAYA

SHAHROM MOHD. DOM.

Pendahuluan:

Semalam, Seminar ini telah membincangkan Masalah2 Penulisan Sejarah Malaysia. Dan saya rasa topik seminar pada malam ini juga sechara tidak langsung mempunyai hubungan yang rapat dengan penulisan dan memahami sejarah Malaysia, terutama sekali sejarah pergerakan nasionalismanya serta sejarahnya selepas Perang Dunia yang kedua.

Penulisan sejarah nasionalisma — sejarah negara ini selepas perang — mengalami beberapa kesulitan juga. Kesulitan mencari dan mendapatkan bahan2 primari dan juga, yang lebih penting ialah memahami (interpretasi) sejarah perkembangan nasionalisma itu sendiri.

Tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa satu re-interpretasi sejarah kita adalah perlu, tetapi sapertimana yang dinyatakan oleh seorang ahli panel semalam, bahawa seharusnya, pula, reinterpretasi ini tidak menjadi hamba kepada faktor2 dan kehendak2 zaman ini, atau pun menjadikannya alat untuk tujuan2 yang bukannya bersifat sejarah.

Dan reinterpretasi ini juga akan mengalami, sekurang2nya, dua kesulitan yang sechara langsung mempersoalkan pula asas2 penulisan sejarah itu sendiri.

1. reintrepretasi dari rekod2 dan butir2 sejarah.
2. reintrepretasi atau pun pengalaman 'man-on-the spot'.

Didalam usaha kita hendak memahami atau lebih memahami akan sejarah, terutama sekali sejarah yang contemporary, kerap kali pula reinterpretasi atau pun interpretasi itu sendiri amat mengelirukan.

Baru2 ini misalnya, terlalu banyak sekali kesusasteraan ditulis berkenaan UMNO, dan mungkin untuk lebih menggairahkan lagi sambutan Jubli Perak mereka karangan2 dan anggapan2 bahawa UMNO merupakan partai politik yang memperjuangkan kemerdekaan, dan kerana itu disamakan pula dengan nasionalisma negara ini, ditekankan.

Implikasi dari kenyataan ini ialah seolah2 UMNO sahaja merupakan partai yang memperjuangkan kemerdekaan, yang bersifat kebangsaan dan juga tanggapan bahawa sejarah pergerakan UMNO bererti sejarah pergerakan nasionalisma negara ini. Tegasnya, sejarah nasionalisma merupakan sejarah partai yang memerintah.

Sebenarnya, nasionalisma lebih merupakan fenomena abad ke 20an, sekurang2nya dirantau ini. Dan pergerakan nasionalisma lebih digunakan sebagai pergerakan yang bertujuan membebaskan negara dari chengkaman dan pemerentahan penjajah.

Oleh kerana itu pergerakan nasionalisma di Malaya tidak terbatas kepada satu2 partai politik sahaja. Pergerakan nasionalisma juga merupakan tenaga2 dinamik didalam masyarakat itu, yang dipadukan saperti yang terjelma didalam perjuangan, chita2 dan dasar2 partai2 politik yang terlibat.

Juga, interpritasi sejarah (penulisan) nasionalisma di Malaya, melibatkan juga maksud 'kemerdekaan'. Kerana hanya dengan ini dapat kita fahami tentang kémunchulan berbagai2 partai politik yang mempunyai (tidak mempunyai) ideoloji dan pengertian mereka sendiri terhadap 'kemerdekaan' dan memperjuangkannya chara mereka sendiri.

Pada faham saya, ada dua pengertian 'kemerdekaan'.

1. Kemerdekaan politik:

yang merupakan pada hakikatnya perubahan tampuk pimpinan dan personaliti, tetapi tidak merombak sistim kolonial dahulu.

2. Kemerdekaan politik dan ekonomi:

kemerdekaan dikedua2 bidang yang mendaulatkan negara.

Selain daripada itu bentuk 'kemerdekaan' itu juga adalah berlainan:

1. kemerdekaan didalam Commonwealth.

2. kemerdekaan sebagai satu yunit Republic Indonesia Raya.

3. kemerdekaan — Republik Komunis Malaya.

Kerana perbebedaan2 ini menimbulkan berbagai2 pergerakan dan juga partai2 politik, yang semuanya mahu membebaskan negara daripada penjajahan. Dan dikebelakangan ini pula pergerakan nasionalisma juga dapat diertikan sebagai perjuangan untuk menchapai kemerdekaan yang tulen, ia-itu penentangan terhadap imperialisma dan juga neo-kolonialisma. Tegasnya, perjuangan kemerdekaan selepas 'merdeka'.

Pada malam ini saya hanya akan chuba membincangkan satu aspek sahaja dari pergerakan nasionalisma dinegara kita ini. Juga menjadi harapan saya agar dapat memberi satu reinterpritasi terhadap-masalah yang rumit ini.

Bukan menjadi tujuan saya hendak mengadili atau menilai pergerakan mana atau partai mana yang benar dan disebaliknya. Dan bukan juga tujuan saya hendak mengukur kegagalan dan

kejayaan pergerakan ini dan partai2 yang terlibat didalamnya. Kerana yang benar sekarang mungkin salah esok. Dan yang salah sekarang (kerana minoriti dan tidak diterima) tidak bererti mereka akan gagal esok.

Juga, kerana istilah nasionalisma yang memberi erti pergerakan untuk kepentingan kebangsaan, saya tidak akan chuba mengadili sama and UMNO, Perikatan atau UKMM sebagai partai2 nasionalis atau tidak Bagitu juga tentang PAS, USRM, DAP, Marhaean, malah PKM.

Saya hanya akan chuba melihat pergerakan dan aktiviti UMNO sebagai sebuah partai politik yang telah dikurniakan kemerdekaan negara ini oleh penjajah Inggeris. Dan diharapkan dapat memberi ilham dan gambaran yang baru dan lebih adil terhadap sejarah pergerakan nasionalisma ditanah ayer kita pada keseluruhannya.

Sudah menjadi kenyataan umum, saya rasa, semua mengetahui bahawa UMNO telah ditubuhkan akibat daripada Kongeres Persatuan2 Melayu di Malaya, pada tanggal 1 hingga 4 Mach 1946. Dan diketahui umum juga bahawa UMNO telah dapat menghancurkan Malayan Union dan dengan itu mengembalikan semula kuasa dan kedudukan raja2 Melayu, dan juga berjaya menggantikannya dengan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu dan akhir sekali menchapai kemerdekaan. (Dan jika hendak ditambah lagi, berjaya meujudkan Malaysia).

Inilah pergerakan nasionalisma UMNO. Tetapi apakah choraknya pergerakan ini? Apakah pergerakan ini benar2 melambangkan hasrat rakyat dan benar2 merupakan pembebasan Malaya daripada pemerintahan kolonial Inggeris?

Saya rasa, sejarah pergerakan nasionalisma UMNO, (bukannya sejarah nasionalisma Malaya keseluruhannya) dapat dibahagikan kepada tiga peringkat:

1. 1946 — 1949
2. 1949 — 1957
 - a. 1949 — 1951.....pimpinan Dato' Onn
 - b. 1951 — 1957.....memperjuangkan 'kemerdekaan', juga pimpinan Tengku.
3. 1957 — hingga sekarang ini.

UMNO sapertimana yang ditubuhkan pada tahun 1946, bukanya merupakan sebuah partai politik. Ia dilahirkan kerana hasrat anggota2 41 kesatuan2 Melayu seluruh Malaya mahu mengembelengkan dan menyatukan tenaga menentang dasar kolonial Inggeris yang mahu lebih menyelaraskan pemerintahan dan pentadbirannya didalam bentuk Malayan Union.

Oleh kerana itu UMNO yang ditubuhkan, lebih berupa satu "Barisan Bertindak" dari kesemua kesatuan2 Melayu, bersatu dan bergabung untuk lebih menguatkan dan memusatkan tenaga dan penentangan mereka terhadap dasar baru Inggeris, selepas peperangan dunia ke dua.

UMNO pada tahun 1946 — 1949 pada keseluruhannya (kechuali PKMM) bukannya sebuah partai politik yang berdasarkan dan bertujuan memperjuangkan kemerdekaan tanah ayer. Ianya adalah satu organisasi dari kesatuan2 Melayu yang mahu mengembalikan dan memperkuatkan lagi kedudukan, kuasa dan marwah Raja2 Melayu dan memperjuangkan kesejahteraan orang2 Melayu (yang menganggap sebagai pribumi negara ini). Perjuangan mereka ini tidak pernah menentang pemerintahan kolonial Inggeris, malah apa yang terdapat ialah memperjuangkan dan menjamin kesejahteraan orang2 Melayu dengan bekerjasama dengan penjajah Inggeris. (Dalam jangka waktu ini hanya sekali mereka memboikot acara resmi kerajaan, i.e. memulaukan hari pertabalan Pesuruh Jaya Tinggi).

Anggota2 UMNO yang terdiri dari 41 kesatuan juga berchorak non-politikal, yang pula mempunyai chita2 berlainan. Diantara yang jelas perbeadaan ialah: PKMM Dewan Perniagaan Melayu, Malaya, Darul Ihsan Club, Jeram dan Persekutuan Bawean, Selangor.

Dan untuk lebih mendalam mengetahui pergerakan UMNO, dasar2nya (aktiviti2nya) diantara tahun2 1946 — 1949 ialah:

1. Menentang Malayan Union i.e. mengembalikan taraf Raja2 Melayu dan memperjuangkan Melayu Malaya dan menggantikannya pula dengan. "...satu pemerintahan yang boleh diterima oleh *pehak Melayu, British dan Raja2 Melayu* ..." (Dato' Onn di Alor Star, Januari 1947).

2. Persekutuan Tanah Melayu.

a. memperjuangkan untuk kebijakan dan menjamin kedudukan orang2 Melayu dibidang2 politik dan ekonomi dibawah satu sistim pemerintahan kolonial yang lebih efficient.

Maksudnya, jika dikaji segala ketetapan2 dan usul2 dari Persidangan2 Majlis Agung UMNO dari tahun2 1946 — 1949, jelas kelihatan nujur2 berikut:

i. menjamin kedudukan dan perseimbangan jumlah penduduk2 Melayu dengan melarang dan menghalang kemasukkan bangsa2 lain,

ii. membanyakkan lagi orang2 Melayu mengetuai jabatan2 Federal kerajaan terutama sekali Jabatan Immigration dan Pelajaran.

Lawatan Dato' Onn ke London pada bulan November 1948, diantara lain2 mengusahkan supaya Tengku Yaacob dan Tengku Abu Bakar mengetuai jabatan2 Federal.

Masalah ini juga dikaitkan dengan UMNO berkehendakkan jawatan Timbalan Pesuruh Jaya Tinggi dipegang oleh orang Melayu.

Tegasnya disini, bahawa apa yang diperjuangkan oleh UMNO ialah mengambil bahagian yang lebih didalam pentadbiran satu pemerintahan kolonial. Anggapan ini adalah tepat kerana jika menurut Dato' Onn, bahawa sebab Malaya belum boleh lagi merdeka ialah kerana kekurangan tenaga Melayu yang mahir dan mampu mentadbirkan negara.

"Kita berkehendak menteri kawalan, menteri pelajaran dan lain2nya. Adakah orang Melayu layak jawatan2 itu. Jawabnya tidak ada. Jadi kita latehkan dahulu." (UMNO/SG 15/1947).

Kerana tujuan2 mahu melateh dan lebih banyak lagi mengambil bahagian didalam pentadbiran, UMNO Bahagian Selangor sapertimana yang dilapurkan didalam Utusan Melayu, 20 Oktober 1948, merasa tidak senang hati kerana "...kalangan2 penganjur UMNO, hal yang diutamakan oleh pemimpin2 ialah semata2 perkara diri sendiri dan soal jawatan masing2 sahaja."

Tegasnya, bagi UMNO, Dato' Onn dan puchuk pimpinan sekurang2nya, bagi tahun2 1946—1949, Malaya belum layak lagi merdeka. Kerana itu dasar2nya hanya merupakan kebajikan dan melibatkan diri didalam pentadbiran Inggeris sahaja. Hanya dari segi ini dapat kita memahami slogan 'Hidup Melayu' yang menjadi asas perjuangan UMNO hingga tahun 1951 atau sapertimana kata Dato' Onn juga, "...menyesuaikan kehendak UMNO dengan kehendak British." (Dato' Onn di Alor Star, Januari 1947).

Hanya pada 25hb Mach 1951, sechara resmi UMNO memperjuangkan "kemerdekaan" Malaya dan istilah merdeka mengantikan slogan 'Hidup Melayu'. Dan saya rasakan tahun 1949 sebagai detik permulaan ini.

Pada tahun 1949 UMNO yang dahulunya merupakan sebuah organisasi kesatuan2 Melayu, kini berubah menjadi satu partai politik. Anggota2nya bukan lagi dari kesatuan2 tetapi anggota2 yang berdaftar terus. Oleh itu saya menganggap bahawa UMNO sebagai sebuah partai politik yang memperjuangkan "kemerdekaan" hanya bermula pada tahun 1949.

Tetapi kemerdekaan bentuk apa yang diperjuangkan oleh UMNO?

Sapertimana yang dinyatakan diatas, pada bulan Januari 1947, didalam ucapannya di Alor Star, Dato' Onn menegaskan bahawa Malaya belum lagi layak merdeka.

Dan semasa lawatannya ke London pada bulan November 1948, Dato' Onn berkata, "Saya perchaya penuh bahawa bagi pihak Malaya harus mengikat dirinya seberapa yang rapat dengan Great Britain. Saya tahu ada segulungan kecil penduduk Malaya sekarang yang ingin segera merdeka penuh tetapi saya kira orang2 ini hanya ingin sangat hendak segera membunuh dirinya." (Utusan Melayu, 4 November 1948)

Pada bulan Mei 1949, di Butterworth, Dato' Onn menjelaskan undang2 tubuh UMNO yang baru hendak melengkapkan UMNO sebagai sebuah partai politik yang bertujuan kepada kemerdekaan Malaya. (Utusan Melayu, 31 Mei 1949).

Dan terakhir sekali pada 20hb Mei 1950, didalam Persidangan Khas Majlis Meshuarat Agung UMNO, di Kuala Lumpur, Dato' Onn menegaskan pula bahawa perpaduan kaum adalah perlu untuk kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan Malaya. (UMNO/SG 124/1950).

Dari kenyataan2 diatas, kita tidak hendak mempersoalkan perubahan2 sikap Dato' Onn sendiri terhadap kemerdekaan. Tetapi yang lebih penting ialah kemerdekaan apa yang diperjuangkan UMNO. Adakah kemerdekaan 'yang mengikat dirinya seberapa rapat dengan Great Britain'?

Saya rasakan, kemerdekaan yang diperjuangkan tepat sekali dengan yang dinyatakan oleh Dato' Onn i.e. kemerdekaan politik sedangkan dibidang ekonomi tetap tidak berubah.

Jika dikaji Rancangan Lima tahun UMNO (UMNO SG/128/1947), sebagai sebuah partai politik yang kuat, yang menjadi masalah pokok baginya ialah kekurangan atau ketiadaan modal bagi orang2 Melayu. Oleh kerana itu rancangannya:

- 1948: mendirikan Sharikat Pengangkutan Lorry, Bus dan Motor-Boat.
- 1949: mendirikan perusahaan kilang dengan tujuan hendak membanyakkan lagi pendapatan orang2 kampung.
- 1950: dari modal yang terkumpul akan ditubuhkan sebuah Bank Melayu.
- 1951: membuka perniagaan besar luar dan dalam negeri.
- 1952: dari modal yang terkumpul, membayar hutang2 orang2 Melayu dan menebus tanah2 mereka yang tergadai.

Jelas kelihatan bahawa rancangan ekonomi ini tidak sedikit pun menyentuh kebebasan dan kemerdekaan ekonomi Malaya atau pun tentang kedudukan ekonomi Inggeris. Agak penting juga diketahui bahawa didalam satu editorial, Utusan Melayu, 6hb Jun 1948, mengatakan, "...Perekonomian bangsa Melayu telah roboh semenjak masuknya modal asing kenagara ini." Maksudnya, masyarakat Melayu

adalah tidak jahil tentang kekukuhan ekonomi Inggeris dan modal2 asing dan agak aneh kenapa Ranchangan Lima tahun UMNO ini tidak menyintuh masalah pokok perekonomian orang Melayu, seperti-manajuga yang diketarakan didalam sebuah Artikel hari yang sama, didalam Utusan Melayu.

Tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa pergerakan nasionalisma UMNO ini, i.e. perengkat pertamanya lebih merupakan menentukan kedudukan orang2 Melayu dan akhirnya "kemerdekaan," adalah sebahagian daripada pergerakan nasionalisma negara ini. Dan mungkin keterlaluan atau extreme hendak menganggap seperti surat Md. Yusuf Ayub, 15 Oktober 1946 yang ditujukan kepada Datok Penglima Bukit Gantang (Setia Usaha Agung UMNO) (lihat UMNO/SG 12/1946) yang bertanyakan, "...adakah tujuan Raja2 dan Datok2 mengajak rakyat bersatu untuk membangkang Malayan (Union) itu kerana faedah bersama (Raja dan Rakyat) atau semata2 faedah puak bangsawan sahaja..."

Ini mungkin pendapat yang extreme, yang menganggap golongan bangsawan yang menguasai UMNO, tetapi adalah juga penting mengetahui bahawa didalam satu surat dari S.U. Perikatan Melayu Perak, kepada Datok Penglima Bukit Gantang bertarikh 17. Oktober 1946 berkenaan tuduhan2 diatas, beliau menulis, "...*There is a lot of truth in what he says but the way he says it is magnificiently rude. I happen to know this gentleman as bordering insanity and his past records leave much to be desired.*" (lihat UMNO/SG 12/1946).

Dan adalah juga aneh melihatkan bahawa sejarah pergerakan nasionalisma UMNO ini, perengkat pertamanya amat bertentangan dengan apa yang diperjuangkannya pada tahun2 1946 — 1947.

UMNO memang benar dapat menimbulkan semangat kebangsaan, tetapi kerana reaksi terhadap kolonialisma Inggeris dan kerjasama UMNO dengannya, juga telah menimbulkan pergerakan nasionalisma yang lain. Dan harus diingat pula bahawa UMNO bukanlah 'the nationalist movement' negara ini. Telah wujud partai2 politik lain sebelum UMNO sendiri. Kesatuan Melayu Muda, PKMM malah selepas peperangan dunia kedua PKM merupakan hanya partai politik yang halal dinegara ini.

Tidak juga dinafikan bahawa UMNO (Perikatan) merupakan partai yang dianugerahkan "kemerdekaan " oleh penjajah Inggeris. Tetapi sekali lagi ini tidak bererti bahawa pergerakan nasionalisma negara ini adalah sejarah nasionalisma UMNO. Kerana pergerakan nasionalisma bukannya monopoli sesebuah partai sahaja.

Pergerakan nasionalisma kita seolah2 kelihatan homogeneous dan merupakan monopoli UMNO ialah kerana tindakan2 Inggeris sendiri menghalang dan mengharamkan serta melumpuhkan pergerakan2 lain terutama sekali sejak tahun 1948.

Apabila Dharurat diistiharkan pada 16 Jun 1948, pergerakan politik (selain UMNO) adalah lemah malah terbantut. Dengan kuasa dan pengistiharan Dharurat, penangkapan dan penahanan2 anggota2 politik amat berleluasa.

Pada 21 Jun (lima hari setelah dharurat diistiharkan) sembilan orang anggota PKMM dari chawangan Balik Pulau dan Seberang Prai telah ditangkap. Pada 1hb Julai, Ahmad Boestaman ditahan. Empat hari berikutnya pula, Pengerusi PKMM, Bahagian Selangor, Yahya Nasim, ditahan. Sepuluh hari kemudiannya, 15hb Julai Ishak Hj. Mohd., YDP PKMM mengikut jejak. 29hb. Julai tujuh orang puchuk pimpinan Hisbul Muslimin ditangkap Inggeris.

Didalam jangka waktu sebulan lebih selepas Dharurat diistiharkan, PKMM dan API telah lumpuh. Didalam jangka waktu yang sama Malayan Democratic Union, PKM, MPAJA, Ikatan Pembela Tanah Ayer, API, telah diharamkan. Gelanggang politik Malaya hanya dikuasai oleh UMNO. Tegasnya, dengan penindasan2 dan tekanan2 Inggeris membolehkan UMNO menguatkan dirinya dan terus hidup menerima kemerdekaan tanpa chabaran.

ADA-KAH MALAYSIA MEMPUNYAI GERAKAN NASIONALISMA?

AHMAD BOESTAMAN

Apakah nasionalisma?

WALTER THEIMER, dalam bukunya yang berjudul *Encyclopedia of World Politics*, mengatakan bahawa nasionalisma itu (a) sebagai suatu sentimen kepuakan atau *group sentiment* yang didasarkan atas ciri2 bangsa, terutamanya bahasa dan kebudayaan, dengan kechenderungan menekankan perbedaannya antara satu bangsa dengan satu bangsa yang lain; dan (b) sebagai perlakuan membesar-besarkan sentimen tersebut.

Menurut beliau sentimen kepuakan ini sudah ada sejak zaman ketamadunan Graeco-Roman dan lain2 ketamadunan yang terdulu lagi tetapi nasionalisma modern bermula kira2 dalam abad yang kedelapan belas. Nasionalisma ini berusaha untuk menempatkan dirinya sebagai sesuatu yang paling tinggi nilainya, menaluri semua bidang pemikiran, sentimen dan tindakan manusia. Kepentingan puak menjadi satu-satunya asas penentu dasar mereka. Mereka memuja milik, sejarah dan kejayaan puak mereka saja sehingga ada ketikanya nasionalisma ini merupakan suatu 'agama' pula.

Kalau pengistilahan Walter Theimer ini hendak diringkaskan kedalam suatu pengistilahan yang mudah dipahamkan maka kita bolehlah memakai istilah nasionalisma yang sering digunakan oleh tokoh2 politik Indonesia, diantaranya Soekarno, yaitu 'chita2 yang mengingini serba kebaikan bangsa'.

Timbulnya nasionalisma

Karl Marx mengatakan, sesudah menjalankan penyelidikan, bahwa dimana ada dua golongan yang bertentangan — yang satu menindas dan yang satu lagi ditindas — maka disana lambat launnya akan berlakulah hukum antitesi atau hukum pertentangan yang mengakibatkan perjuangan antara kedua golongan itu.

Bila suatu bangsa dijajah maka dalam negeri bangsa yang dijajah itu sechara otomatis lahir dua golongan yang bertentangan — satu golongan yang menjajah (yang datang) dan satu lagi golongan yang terjajah (yang sudah sedia). Mereka bertentangan kerana yang pertama mau mengekalkan penjajahannya itu sedang yang kedua mau melepaskan diri daripadanya.

Yang pertama mengamalkan kolonialisma atau imperialisma manakala yang kedua 'membakar diri' dengan nasionalisma. Dan sintesinya tentulah saja Kemerdekaan Nasional.

Suatu contoh yang mudah bagi membenarkan hakikat ini ialah apa yang telah berlaku di Indonesia. Bukankah pertentangan diantara penjajahan Belanda dan kemudian penjajahan Jepun dengan nasionalisme Indonesia dulu yang melahirkan Indonesia Merdeka sekarang?

Dari sini dapatlah kita katakan bahwa nasionalisme merupakan antitesi kepada kolonialisme dan imperialisme atau dulu-dulunya antitesi kepada universalisme Roma yang mau menguasai alam jagat ini.

Xenophobia

Amat Jahari Moain B.A. (Hons.), dalam bukunya yang berjudul *Sejarah Nasionalisme Maphilindo*, ada menimbulkan suatu perkataan yang berlainan samasakali ertinya dari nasionalisme tetapi sering pula disamakan orang. Perkataan itu ialah *xenophobia*.

Berkata beliau, 'Oleh kerana banyak ciri2 dan pola2 yang bersamaan antara Nasionalisme dan Xenophobia maka payah juga (pada banyak ketikanya) kita mau menilai perjuangan seseorang — sama ada perjuangan seseorang itu bersipat nasionalisme atau xenophobis.'

Memang ada benarnya dalam kata2 beliau ini. Nasionalisme menentang kolonialis dan imperialis; dan kerana kolonialis dan imperialis itu selalunya orang asing dan bukan orang sebangsa maka pada lahirnya kelihatan seolah-olah nasionalis menentang atau membenchi orang2 asing.

Xenophobis datang dari dua perkataan Latin *xeno* dan *phobos*. *Xeno* ertinya 'asing' atau 'ganjil' dan *phobos* ertinya 'momok' atau 'takut'. Jadi *xenophobos* dapatlah diertikan 'takut atau memomokkan segala yang asing' termasuk orang asing atau bangsa asing.

Tetapi kesukaran yang dikatakan oleh Amat Jahari Moain ini pasti tidak akan kita hadapi sekiranya kita benar2 mengerti apadia yang dikatakan imperialisme itu. Apakah ia suatu bangsa, merupa dalam bentuk manusia?

Mari kita tinjau erti imperialisme sebagaimana yang diberikan oleh Soekarno dalam bukunya yang berjudul *Indonesia Menggugat*. Berkata beliau, 'Imperialisme juga suatu paham. Imperialisme juga suatu pengertian. Ia bukan pemerintah, bukan badan apa pun juga. Ia adalah suatu napsu, suatu sistim menguasai atau mempengaruhi ekonomi atau negeri bangsa lain. Ia adalah suatu kejadian dalam pergaulan hidup, yang timbulnya ialah oleh keharusan2 dalam ekonomi sesuatu negeri atau sesuatu bangsa. Selama ada 'ekonomi bangsa', selama ada 'ekonomi negeri', selama itu dunia melihat imperialisme.....'

'Imperialisme terdapat disemua zaman "perekonomian bangsa", terdapat pada semua bangsa yang ekonominya sudah perlu pada imperialisme itu. Bukan pada bangsa kulit putih saja ada imperialisme tetapi pada semua bangsa. Ia adalah keharusan yang ditentukan oleh

rendah tingginya ekonomi sesuatu pergaulan hidup, yang tak memandang bulu?

Jadi, disinilah bedanya diantara seorang nasionalis dengan seorang xenophobo. Sementara seorang xenophobo membenchi bangsa asing melulu karena keasingan bangsanya dan tidak karena yang lain maka seorang nasionalis membenchi bangsa asing karena napsu menguasai atau mempengaruhi ekonomi atau negeri orang lain yang diamalkan oleh bangsa asing itu sedang keasingan bangsa ini hanyalah suatu kebetulan saja.

Adakah Malaysia mempunyai Gerakan Nasionalisma?

Dengan pengertian2 diatas ini sekarang bolehlah kita masuk kedalam tajuk seminar kita malam ini. Tajuk itu merupakan suatu pertanyaan: 'Adakah Malaysia mempunyai gerakan Nasionalisma?'

Sejak Malaysia mengenal penguasaan penjajahan dalam abad yang keenam belas dulu nasilisma mulai tumbuh di kalangan rakyatnya. Ini sesuai dengan hukum antitesi yang dinyatakan diatas tadi. Sesungguhnya karena adanya nasionalisma inilah maka penguasaan penjajahan keatas negeri ini dulu tidak berlaku sechara aman damai atau tanpa penentangan dari rakyat. Dan karena inilah pula maka sejarah tanah air kita mengenal pahlawan2 seperti Dol Said, Datuk Bahaman, Mat Kilau, Tuk Janggut, Datuk Maharajalela, dan lain2.

Apakah phalawan tersebut xenophobos ataupun nasionalis?

Pada saya jawabnya mudah saja. Mereka bukan xenophobos. Dan alasan saya untuk mengatakan ini ialah fakta2 sejarah sebelum datangnya penjajahan itu.

Sebelum penjajahan datang menguasai tanah air kita dulu kita sudah punya hubungan2, terutama perdagangan, dengan bangsa2 asing seperti China, Siam dan Arab. Ini dengan sendirinya membuktikan bahwa kita tidak pernah mengamalkan dasar isolasionisma (pemencilan diri) yang sebelum Perang Dunia Kedua dulu dianjurkan supaya diamalkan oleh Amerika Serikat oleh satu kumpulan tokoh-tokohnya yang diketuai oleh Senatar Borah. Tetapi inilah juga yang membuktikan bahwa 'momok bangsa asing karena keasingan bangsanya' tidak pernah kita kenal dan karena itu, lojisnya, mustahillah pahlawan2 kita tadi itu xenophobis sipatnya.

Jadi, apakah mereka? Jawabnya: Mereka adalah nasionalis—nasionalis2 yang sesuai pada zaman itu, yang menggambarkan keadaan masharakat ketika itu.

Masyarakat ketika itu adalah masyarakat feodal. Maka pahlawan2 kita tadi itu dengan sendirinya menjadi nasionalis2 feodal atau nasionalis2 yang mau menegakkan dan mempertahankan kepentingan2 kaum feodal yang mereka wakili ataupun setidak-tidaknya yang mereka khidmati.

Tetapi akhirnya kaum imperialis menang juga dan mulailah ia bertapak di tanah air kita ini. Perlawanan nasionalis2 feodal kita hancur berkecah dan kuku imperialisma pun mulailah menchengkam hidup bangsa dan negeri kita.

Kemudian bermulalah persekongkolan diantara imperialisma dengan feodalisma di tanah air kita ini bagi menjadikan rakyat negeri ini anak2 tanah jajahan yang patuh dan setia. Untuk memungkinkan ini kaum feodal ditambah dengan kesenangan dan kemewahan hidup.

Apakah dengan itu nasionalisma mati dan berkubur? Tidak. Ia sekadar tidak menampakkan mukanya sechara terang-terangan. Persekongkolan imperialisma dan feodalisma, dengan segala undang2 dan peraturan-peraturannya, begitu kuat sehingga tidak mungkin serta merta dihadapi dan ditentang sechara terang-terangan. Pada ketika itu nasionalisma dapat dikatakan seperti api didalam sekam saja.

Kemudian datanglah dasar penjajahan yang terkenal di negeri ini dengan panggilan DASAR PINTU TERBUKA yang membolehkan orang2 dari luar negeri terutama dari Tiongkok dan India masuk ke negeri ini dan tinggal disini dengan ramainya. Alasan yang diberikan ialah mereka diperlukan untuk menjadi buruh — buruh tambang dan buruh ladang (*estate*). Dan mulalah kaum2 mendatang ini mengatasi kaum bumiputera dalam segala lapangan terutama lapangan perdagangan dan ekonomi.

Para nasionalis, terutamanya yang bekerja sebagai wartawan2 dalam suratkabar2, mula beragitasi seperti menulis renchana2 dalam suratkabar2 menyeru orang2 Melayu supaya bersatu-padu dan berusaha menebus ketinggalan atau kachichiran mereka dalam segala lapangan terutama lapangan ekonomi berbanding dengan bangsa2 yang mendatang sedang mereka berada di tanah air mereka sendiri. Kata2 yang menuduh bangsa2 yang mendatang itu membolot kekayaan negeri ini sering sekali didengar.

Walaupun sebenarnya bangsa penjajah yang lebih banyak membolot kekayaan negeri ini daripada bangsa2 yang mendatang itu tetapi karena para nasionalis ketika itu tidak ada yang akademis seperti James Putucherry yang menulis buku *Who Owns Malaya?* yang membuka tembelang yang sebenarnya maka bangsa2 asing yang mendatang itulah yang menjadi sasaran bidasan mereka dan bukannya bangsa penjajah.

Salah anggapan ini berjalan terus tanpa siapa membetulkannya. Penjajah pula tidak mau berbuat apa2 tentang ini, misalnya mengakui keadaan yang sebenar tentang dirinya. Sebabnya memang sudah jelas.

yaitu demi kepentingan dasar penjajahan yang terkenal: DIVIDE ET IMPERA atau pecah2 dan kemudian perintah.

Selama rakyat sesama rakyat churiga menchurigai dan berumusub-musuhan maka tidaklah akan lahir persatuan dan perpaduan di kalangan mereka dan dengan itu penjajah akan boleh menjajah terus dengan selamat. Inilah yang diharapkan oleh penjajah tadi.

Sehingga ini apa yang dinamakan gerakan nasionalisma belum lagi ada. Yang ada baru nasionalisma saja. Bila kita menyebut gerakan terutama dalam politik ia bererti suatu badan, suatu organisasi, sebuah partai politik.

Lahirnya Gerakan Nasionalisma

Tidak adanya gerakan nasionalisma ketika itu karena penjajah telah memperundang-undangan bahwa rakyat dibolehkan mendirikan persatuan2 tetapi persatuan2 itu dilarang keras menchampuri hal ihwal politik. Karena takut melanggar kehendak penjajah ini sedang semangat nasionalisma terus meluap-luap juga maka mulailah dilahirkan persatuan2 bukan politik dan yang mengambil peranan penting di dalam nya ialah para nasionalis feodal. Demikianlah maka lahirnya Persatuan Melayu Selangor, Persatuan Melayu Perak, Kesatuan Melayu Singapura dan seterusnya.

Bahwa nasionalis feodal yang mula tampil kemuka ini tidak mengherankan sedikit juga. Pertama karena mereka pun, berbanding dengan bangsa2 yang mendatang, jauh ketinggalan atau terchichir dibelakang dalam segala bidang. Kedua karena merekalah di kalangan rakyat yang berpeluang mendapat pelajaran yang agak tinggi hasil dari keistimewaan yang diberikan penjajah kepada mereka.

Tetapi para nasionalis feodal ini tidak anti-penjajahan melainkan anti kaum2 yang mendatang yang lebihnya. Kebenaran mereka tidak anti-penjajahan ini diakui oleh Amat Johari Moain dalam bukunya *Sejarah Nasionalisma Maphilindo* pada halaman 174-5 dengan katanya: Pada tahun 1939, kongres kesatuan2 Melayu se-Malaya telah diadakan di Singapura dimana Tengku Ismail menjadi ketuanya. Inilah hasil pertama gerakan nasionalisma Melayu dimana seluruh orang2 Melayu bersatu. Tetapi oleh karena keadaan pada masa itu badan kongres ini masih kuat pro-Inggeris — tegasnya pro-penjajah. Ini dapat diseluk daripada ucapan Tengku Ismail sendiri selaku Ketua Kongres Melayu Pertama itu yang antara lain2 beliau berkata:

'Pemerintah Inggeris itu adalah seumpama air, orang tidak mengambil berat akan air karena dimana-mana ada air, tetapi kalau satu orang sampai kepada satu padang pasir, air tidak ada, maka barulah orang mengerti bagaimana baiknya, pentingnya dan mustahaknya air. Begitulah pemerintah Inggeris itu, andaikata kalau dia pergi dari kita, barulah kita rasa bagaimana baiknya pemerintah Inggeris itu kepada bangsa kita.'

W. R. Roff dalam bukunya *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* pun berkata begitu. Pada halaman 240 buku tersebut beliau antara lain2 menulis: 'In all its public activities and pronouncements the Association remained unwaveringly loyal not only to the traditional Malay establishment but to the British, particularly after the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939.' (Dalam semua aktibiti dan kenyataan-kenyataannya kepada umum Persatuan itu tetap unggul taat setianya bukan saja kepada kerajaan Melayu yang turun temurun tetapi juga kepada Inggeris, terutama sekali setelah meletusnya perang di Eropa dalam bulan September tahun 1939.)

Ya, dalam masa perang itu para nasionalis feodal ini sampai2 mengutus kawat taat setia kepada Kerajaan Inggeris dan berikrar akan berdiri teguh dibelakangnya dalam apa keadaan pun.

Tetapi sekadar nasionalis feodal sajakah yang ada pada ketika itu? Tidak. Nasionalis2 rakyat atau nasionalis2 revolusioner juga ada dan tokoh2 mereka terdiri sebahagian besarnya dari wartawan2 dan guru2 sekolah Melayu karena itulah kedudukan2 paling tinggi yang dapat dicapai oleh golongan bukan feodal pada ketika itu. Dan mereka ini adalah anti-penjajah sebagaimana yang dapat dibuktikan dari tulisan2 Ishak bin Haji Muhammad dan Ibrahim bin Haji Yaakub yang banyak tersiar dalam surat-kabar2 Melayu ketika itu.

Kemudian lahirlah Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) yang dipimpin oleh Ibrahim bin Haji Yaakub dan didalamnya juga turut Ishak bin Haji Muhammad.

KMM terang2 menyatakan bahwa ia sebuah organisasi politik rakyat yang anti-penjajahan, yang tidak mau bekerjasama dengan penjajah, yang kiri dan yang menyaranakan sosialisma. Dengan lain perkataan ia dapatlah dikatakan bertentangan seperti bumi dengan langit dengan Persatuan2 Melayu anjuran nasionalis2 feodal tadi.

Sebelumnya Ishak bin Haji Muhammad aktif dalam Kesatuan Melayu Singapura tetapi karena chita2 anti-penjajahan yang membakar adanya tidak dapat diterima dalam golongan nasionalis feodal itu maka itulah sebabnya dia meninggalkan mereka dan menyekutukan diri dalam KMM.

Kesatuan Melayu Muda sebenarnya tidak dimaksudkan oleh pengasas-pengasasnya sebagai Kesatuan atau organisasi politik bagi Pemuda2 Melayu sebagaimana yang sering disalah-pahamkan orang. dulu dan sekarang, melainkan sebagai organisasi politik bagi orang2 Melayu berjiwa muda sebagaimana halnya dengan Turki Muda atau *Young Turks* di Turki pada zaman Kemal Attaturk dulu.

Dan ia mendapat inspirasi politik kiri, progresif dan sosialis-tisnya itu ialah dari pembacaan tokoh-tokohnya yang banyak membacah buku2 dan surat-kabar2 dari Indonesia serta dari kontek atau perhubungan peribadi mereka dengan tokoh2 perjuangan Indonesia

yang sering berkunjung ke negeri ini, sechara sulit2 terutamanya, dan yang menetap tinggal disini seperti Sutan Jenain, misalnya.

W. R. Roff dalam bukunya *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* menulis pada halaman 234 antara lain2 begini: 'Jika Ibrahim Yaakub dan KMM bermaksud hendak melahirkan sebuah gerakan massa atau setidak-tiadaknya sebuah organisasi politik yang menyeluruh maka mereka telah gagal segagal-gagalnya. Sungguhpun tidak ada daftar jumlah anggotanya namun kemungkinannya ialah jumlah ini tidak melebihi beberapa ratus orang.'

Pada halaman 231 pula beliau antara lain menulis: 'Dalam maksud, ia (KMM) adalah sebuah organisasi nasional, markas besarnya dan sebahagian besar anggota-anggotanya sebenarnya tinggal di Kuala Lumpur, sungguhpun beberapa orang daripada mereka (termasuk Ishak bin Haji Muhammad yang pada ketika itu menjadi anggota sidang pengarang harian *Warta Malaya* di Singapura) tinggal di tempat lain dalam Semenanjung itu. Sukar untuk mendapatkan jumlah anggotanya yang sebenar sekalipun dalam tahun 1938 jumlah ini tidak mungkin melebihi angka 50 atau 60.'

Sebagai seorang pelaku, meskipun bukan pelaku utama dalam KMM itu, dapat saya katakan bahwa W. R. Roff disini telah membuat suatu penilaian rendah terhadap KMM. Malah beliau dengan mudah dapat didustakan oleh buku *Sejarah dan Perjuangan di Malaya* karangan I. K. Agastja (Ibrahim Yaakub sendiri) dan halaman 180—81 dari buku *Sejarah Nasionalisma Maphilindo* karangan Amat Johari Moain B.A. (Hons.).

KMM bukan mempunyai anggota2 di Kuala Lumpur bahkan juga disetiap negeri yang ada dalam Malaya ketika itu termasuk beberapa orang dari golongan feudal. Seorang berdua dari Raja2 Melayu yang memerintah ketika itu malah mempunyai hubungan yang rapat dan baik dengan Ibrahim Yaakub.

Suatu lagi keistimewaan KMM ialah ini. KMMlah satu-satunya organisasi ketika itu yang mempunyai chawangan intelijennya yang tersendiri yang disokong kuat oleh KAUM DARAT dan wanita2 yang dikenal sebagai KUPU2 MALAM.

Kaum Darat memberikan maklumat tentang jalan2 memotong atau memintas didalam hutan dan tenaga pemandu jalan untuk berjalan didalam hutan belantara Malaya.

Kupu2 Malam mengorek rahasia dari individu2 tentera Ingeris yang berhubungan dengan mereka tentang tempat2 dan daerah2 di Malaya yang ada ditempatkan tentera2 Ingeris itu, jumlah kekuatannya dan lain2 seumpamanya. Dengan lain perkataan mereka ini bukan saja mendapat wang atau rezeki dari perhubungan dengan individu2 tentera Ingeris itu bahkan juga mendapat rahasia2 tentera untuk disampaikan kepada chawangan intelijen KMM tadi.

Sesungguhnya karena sempurna dan teratur baik chawangan intelijen KMM inilah maka penjajah Inggeris segera menggulung tikar keluar meninggalkan Malaya dulu dengan korban yang sedikit-dikitnya di pihak tentera Jepun.

Pada saya KMMlah gerakan politik nasionalis yang benar² dan pertama ada di tanah air kita ini.

Zaman Pemerintahan Jepun

Dalam masa Jepun memerintah Malaya KMM jugalah satu-satunya organisasi nasionalisma yang hidup dan bergerak chergas di negeri ini. Dengan lain perkataan golongan nasionalis rakyatlah yang memegang peranan penting sedang nasionalis² feodal tinggal mendiamkan diri saja.

Pada lahirnya KMM bekerjasama dengan Jepun tetapi yang sebenarnya KMM memainkan peranan talam dua muka. Dengan Jepun KMM pura² baik dan bekerjasama tetapi disebalik itu KMM membuat hubungan pula dengan anti-Jepun yang aktif bergerak pada ketika itu ataupun orang-orangnya menubuhkan sendiri organisasi² dibawah tanah sechara kechil-kechilan untuk menentang Jepun.

Demikianlah halnya sehingga Jepun menyerah kalah dan meninggalkan Malaya untuk didatangi semula oleh penjajah Inggeris.

Setelah Jepun Menyerah Diri

Setelah Jepun menyerah diri dalam tahun 1945 dan sebelum pun tentera pendudukan Inggeris menduduki Malaya semula para nasionalis rakyat telah mendului para nasionalis feodal dalam menubuhkan organisasi nasionalisma di negeri ini. Organisasi tersebut dinamakan Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM) dibawah pimpinan Mokhtaruddin Lasso, seorang pejuang anti-Jepun, yaitu dalam bulan September 1945.

Tujuannya ialah untuk memperjuangkan kemerdekaan penuh bagi Malaya menyatukan Malaya dengan Indonesia Merdeka dengan melahirkan slogan yang terkenal INDONESIA-MALAYA SATU dan menegakkan suatu pemerintahan nasional yang terajunya dipegang oleh rakyat.

Ini diikuti pula dengan penubuhan Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) dalam bulan Februari tahun 1946 yang merupakan barisan pemuda rakyat separuh tentera yang akan memperjuangkan kemerdekaan penuh bagi Malaya itu dengan kekuatan senjata jika perlu. Disini para nasionalis rakyat juga yang memegang peranan utama atau yang tampil kemuka.

Kemudian apabila penjajah Inggeris chuba hendak menipu Raja2 Melayu dengan ranchangan Malayan Unionnya barulah nasionalis2 feudal mengorak langkah dan mengatur barisan untuk menghancurkan Malayan Union itu. Disini PKMM menampak peluang baginya untuk menaburkan agitasinya mengajak rakyat menentang penjajahan dan memperjuangkan kemerdekaan penuh tanah air yang diidam-idamkannya. Lantas ia pun menggabungkan dirinya dengan nasionalis2 feudal itu dan bersama-sama mengasaskan Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu yang sekarang terkenal dengan panggilan UMNO saja, yaitu kependekan dari namanya dalam bahasa Inggeris (*United Malays National Organisation*).

Berkat perpaduan diantara kiri dan kanan ini Malayan Union dapat dihancurkan. Tetapi sewaktu ini pulalah ternyata tidak mungkin terchapainya pandangan yang sama di kalangan dua golongan nasionalis itu. Sementara golongan nasionalis rakyat maukan perjuangan bersama diteruskan untuk mencapai kemerdekaan penuh bagi Malaya golongan nasionalis feudal berpuashati sekadar mengembalikan status quo.

Inilah yang menyebabkan kemudiannya berlaku perpisahan diantara dua golongan ini atau keluarnya PKMM dari UMNO. Masing2 sekarang memilih jalan sendiri2.

Penjajah memilih kerjasama dengan UMNO dan mereka bersama lantas melahirkan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu (*Federation of Malaya*) sebagai ganti Malayan Union. Bersama juga mereka menentang golongan nasionalis rakyat yang diwakili oleh PKMM. Tokoh utama golongan nasionalis feudal itu ialah Datuk Onn bin Jaafar yang sekarang sudah mendiang.

Sa-telah inilah golongan nasionalis rakyat itu melahirkan badan yang menggabungkan organisasi2 mereka yang dikenal dengan nama Pusat Tenaga Rakyat atau PUTERA. Dan badan ini pula bersama-sama dengan badan gabungan organisasi2 kiri bukan Melayu yang sudah terdiri ketika itu mendirikan gabungan yang lebih besar yang terkenal dengan gabungan PUTERA — AMCJA.

Perjuangan sechara perlembagaan PUTERA — AMCJA tidak lama tetapi penuh sejarah. Gabungan inilah yang merangkakan sebuah perlembagaan negara yang dikemukakannya kepada pihak penjajah sebagai perlembagaan Malaya yang dapat menjamin perpaduan rakyat bagi menggantikan Malayan Union tetapi penjajah dan golongan nasionalis feudal telah menolaknya.

Perlembagaan chadangan PUTERA — AMCJA ini terkenal dengan panggilan Perlembagaan Rakyat dengan 10 prinsip rakyatnya.

Gabungan PUTERA — AMCJA ini jugalah yang kemudiannya melancarkan HARTAL di seluruh tanah air yang merupakan kemunchak perjuangannya sechara perlembagaan bagi menguatkan tuntutannya supaya Perlembagaan Rakyat chadangnya tadi itu diterima.

Hartal ini disokong penuh oleh setiap lapisan rakyat. Dewan2 perniagaanpun turut menyertainya dengan menutup kedai2 pada hari pelancarannya itu. Malangnya pihak penjajah dengan restu golongan nasionalis feodal memberikan sikap kepala batu terhadapnya. Karena itu sekelip sinar kepercayaan kepada perjuangan sechara perlembagaan yang masih tinggal mengerdip lagi dalam sanubari PUTERA — AMCJA kini sudah padam samasekali.

Namun penjajah terus juga bersikap keras terhadap golongan nasionalis rakyat itu. Pada awal tahun 1948 API, yang belum sempat berumur dua tahun, diharamkan. APilah badan kiri yang pertama sekali diharamkan oleh penjajah atau jauh lebeh dulu dari Partai Komunis Malaya diharamkannya.

Setelah inilah mula timbul keadaan tegang. Kedua belah pihak — penjajah dan golongan nasionalis rakyat tetap juga tidak mau bertolak-angsur. Dan kita tahu bila tali yang sudah tegang itu terus diregang juga alamat akan putus juga sudahnya.

Demikianlah pada tanggal 21 Juni 1948 penjajah lantas mengistiharkan keadaan darurat di seluruh tanah air serentak dengan menjalankan penangkapan beramai-ramai keatas tokoh2 dan anggota2 golongan nasionalis rakyat. Partai Komunis Malaya dan semua organisasi yang sealiran dengannya diharamkan. Organisasi2 kiri yang lainpun turut diharamkannya juga.

Perjuangan bersenjata atau perjuangan gerila yang dipelopori oleh Partai Komunis Malayapun bermulalah. Orang2 nasionalis rakyat yang tidak sempat ditangkap oleh penjajah dibawah Undang2 Daruratnya, untuk mengelakkan tangkapan, tidak punya jalan lain lagi dari menyekutukan diri mereka dalam perjuangan gerila didalam hutan itu.

Dengan teristiharnya Undang2 Darurat tadi itu dan diharamkannya oleh penjajah seluruh organisasi golongan nasionalis rakyat dan komunis maka lahirlah suatu kekosongan, suatu vacuum, dalam gelanggang politik negeri ini. Dan vacuum ini serta merta diisi atau dipenuhi oleh UMNO, organisasi golongan nasionalis feodal tadi itu, yang kini sudah tinggal sebagai satu-satunya badan politik yang halal.

Inilah permulaan zaman gemilang bagi UMNO sehingga sebagaimana yang kita semua sudah sedia maklum membawa kepada lahirnya kemerdekaan bagi negeri ini. Tetapi suatu hal haruslah jangan kita lupakan bahwa sebelum kemerdekaan itu lahir UMNO telah melalui perubahan2 yang berangsur-angsur dalam pandangan politiknya — dari tak mau merdeka kepada mau merdeka, dari memakai semboyan HIDUP MELAYU bertukar memakai semboyan MERDEKA pula.

Perubahan pandangan politik UMNO ini berlaku hasil usaha beberapa orang nasionalis rakyat angkatan baru yang berada didalamnya. Salah seorang dari mereka ini yang mempelopori perjuangan menukar semboyan UMNO dari HIDUP MELAYU kepada MERDEKA itu sehingga berjaya ialah GHARIEB RAUF dari PEMUDA UMNOnya.

Kalau kemudian daripada ini kita dengar banyak badan2 baru yang lahir seperti IMP, Partai Negara, PAS, MCA, MIC, Partai Rakyat dan lain2 lagi tetapi setelah kita kaji susur-galurnya kita pasti akan sampai kepada kesimpulan, sebagai analisisnya yang terakhir, bahwa badan2 tersebut sebenarnya merupakan pechahan dari gerakan2 nasionalis yang terdulunya juga atau setidak-tidaknya ada kaitan dengannya sedikit sebanyak.

IMP dan Partai Negara, misalnya, merupakan pechahan dari UMNO. PAS dan Partai Rakyat dapat dichari susur-galurnya dari PUTERA. Dan MCA serta MIC juga dapat dichari susur-galurnya dari AMCJA dulu.

Sesungguhnya dari uraian serba ringkas diatas ini dapatlah dengan segala kepastiannya saya jawab tajuk seminar malam ini dengan kata2 bahwa Malaysia memang punya gerakan nasionalismanya.

MALAYSIA'S NEUTRALIZATION POLICY

DRS. GOH CHENG TEIK.

The Concept

The present Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Tun Razak has stated repeatedly that Malaysia wants to see South-East Asia neutralized as soon as possible. This emphasis on the word 'neutralization' and not 'non-alignment' is deeply significant because what he envisages is not merely a unilaterally proclaimed non-aligned South-East Asia with its non-alignment endorsed by the Great Powers. Implicitly, the Malaysian Government is recognizing that the region as a whole cannot withstand the armed might of the Great Powers and that the security of states here in South-East Asia cannot be assured through self-enunciated neutrality, whether unarmed or armed, unless the relevant Great Powers are prepared to co-operate.

This concept of neutrality through Great Powers co-operation is most pertinent, especially in a highly fluidic international system as at present. Cambodia's recent experience has shown that a policy of non-alignment becomes a mere scrap of paper if stronger external forces are determined to wreck it.

From a bi-polar to a polycentric World

In the 1950's, Tun Razak's idea would have appeared as a heresy to many important capitals of the world. This is because the world was then divided into two armed camps led by Russia and America. In the name of capitalism and socialism, they and their allies confronted each other eye-ball to eye-ball across the continents of Europe and Asia and in the countries of Africa and South America.

A number of assertive Afro-Asian states led by Nehru's India publicly denounced this global confrontation and disassociated themselves on paper from either power-bloc. This declaration of neutrality was looked upon with utmost disfavour by the two leader states in this 'Cold War'. Both Russia and America could not understand how other states could shirk their international 'obligation' and abstain from a fight waged for their respective versions of mankind's 'common good'. In that frame of mind, the leaders of both states could scarcely be expected to consent to underwrite the neutrality of South-East Asia or any other portion of the globe.

In the 1970's, Tun Razak's suggestion becomes simple common-sense and commands the instinctive support of either liberal-minded and/or war-weary circles in the world's major capitals. This fact does and add to the intrinsic merit of his proposal. It merely reflects the depth and breadth of change that have taken place in the international system during the intervening period.

At least five factors account for the transformation from a rigid, bi-polar to a loose bi-polar but polycentric world.

Firstly, the birth of the Enemy Partners. After a decade-and-a-half of virtually uninterrupted arms build-up, both super-powers — Russia and America — convinced themselves that neither side would survive to enjoy the outcome of a global, thermonuclear war. This conviction became evident after the Cuban Missile crisis and so Russia and America, although enemies by ideology and position, acted as partners against the outbreak of nuclear war between themselves.

Secondly, the rupture within the socialist commonwealth. The old and the new giant Marxist-Leninist states, Russia and China, broke with each other openly in 1960. The rift widened as revived border claims from the Chinese side were added to accusations of ideological treachery. Towards the end of the 1960s, skirmishes along the long, tense Sino-Soviet frontier were occasionally reported.

Thirdly, the cleavage within the North Atlantic community. De Gaulle's France sharply criticised the 'hegemony' practised by America over West Europe and appealed to the Europeans — from the Atlantic to the Urals — to re-emerge and re-assert the Old World's senior position. France tried to break down the barrier between West and East Europe and went to the extent of withdrawing from NATO.

Fourthly, the re-emergence of the ex-Axis states as powerful economic units. West Germany and Japan, thanks to substantial American economic aid, staged an unexpected come back and re-emerged in the 1960s as powerful economic units and invariably challenged the hitherto dominant position in the capitalist world economy held since 1945 by their ex-enemy and ex-benefactor, the United States.

Fifthly, the reduction of Anglo-American military commitments. The British Empire withdrew in the course of the quarter-century after the last world war into Fortress Britain. The United States, after an exuberant expansion programme for two decades after her victory in 1945, began to cut back on her military commitments in Europe and, to an even greater extent, in Asia.

The result of these factors is the emergence of a looser pattern of relationships among the big political units. China, Japan, France, Germany and Britain have actively asserted their own national interests, whether military, political or economic, and have insisted, with varying limitations, on their independence from the respective nuclear super-power. The world in the 1970s is becoming what it was before the Russian Revolution, a world of self-centered nation-states in which appeals to ideological solidarity are treated with utmost cynicism.

This transformation into a loose bi-polar but polycentric structure renders the international system conducive to schemes of neutralization such as that proposed by Tun Razak. The relevant Big Powers cannot object to the neutralization of South-East Asia because to do so would invite immediate comment that it or they harbour covetous on the wealth of the region. Objections on the grounds that the region should be made safe for democracy or socialism would appear hollow given the decline of ideological zeal or the disruption of ideological brotherhood.

The Potential Dangers

The new constellation of forces in the world, therefore, is a condition that favours the neutralization of South-East Asia. On the other hand, it holds out new dangers to the security of this region. The rupture in the socialist commonwealth has led Russia towards 'containment'—mindedness. Leonard Brezhnev showed that he is a Russian John Foster Dulles when he proposed the creation of an Asian Security System presumably to check an alleged Chinese expansionist drive. The recently-forged strategic link with India might be the initial step in the creation of this ambitious, Russian led alliance system directed at China. In view of the complete disengagement of ex-Imperial Britain east of Suez and the distinct American desire to withdraw from the Asian mainland and some of the offshore islands, Russia might find the moment opportune. China, with her longstanding phobia for alleged military encirclements, is not likely to view the emergence of the Moscow-led Asian Security System with equanimity. Peking is likely to solidify her bond with Pakistan and to search frantically for other allies in a counter-alliance. The present peace offensive launched by China may be directed at discouraging Asian states from siding with Russia and at wooing new allies.

Japan will probably be unable to watch dispassionately this developing Sino-Soviet rivalry in South-East Asia and other parts of Asia. She is heavily reliant on oil shipped from the Middle East through the narrow Straits of Malacca and on oil, timber, tin, rubber and fisheries from the Malay Archipelago while the markets in South-East Asia for Japanese manufactures have grown in size. Japan may be induced to develop a navy and air-force and maintain a naval and air presence at selected points in South-East Asia to defend the sea-lanes and protect her sources of raw-material supply and her investments.

These dangers of new big-power rivalry arising from the loose, multi-lateral balance of forces existing in the present world can be reduced, even prevent, by a collective assertion of the will to independence by the South-East Asian states. Hence, it is imperative, unless the conversion of this region into a battle-field for Russian, Chinese and Japanese ambitions is desired, that Malaysia succeeds in the initiative to neutralize South-East Asia.

A Gradual Approach

It is likely that the neutralization of South-East Asia will be a long process of development rather than a sudden act of creation at a summit conference. The stakes are too high and the variables too numerous for the Big Powers and the South-East Asian states themselves to agree overnight.

The logical starting-point for this process of development is Indo-China, the zone of greatest tension in the triangular Moscow-Washington-Peking relationship and the actual arena for a many-sided shooting war. It is logical to begin here because the idea of neutralization is not new to this part of South-East Asia. In 1954, the Geneva Conference had laid the foundations for a neutralized Indo-China but the ideological factor was too strong at that time to allow co-existence between opposing sides. In 1962, another Geneva Conference tried to re-neutralize Laos but again ideology and the respective commitments to the Vietnamese war proved to be stumbling-blocks. If the relevant sides in the Indo-Chinese wars and the three Big Powers concerned (Russia, China and America) can agree in principle to (i) the integration into the national community of all citizens without discrimination; (ii) the inauguration of three governments for a united Laos, Cambodia and a reunited Vietnam formed on the basis of internationally-supervised elections and (iii) the non-alignment of these three Indo-Chinese states to any outside power or combination of powers, the first breakthrough would have been achieved.

Indo-China is the most critical hurdle. If the present wars there can be ended and the peninsula successfully neutralized through the consent of the parties concerned and the participation of the Big Powers, the stage will be set for the eventual neutralization of South-East Asia.

Conflict-Resolution within the Region

The abstention of extra-regional powers from interference in the region's affairs does not by itself guarantee a conflict-free South-East Asia. The states within the region are capable of conflict among themselves.

The region's ethnic and religious diversity and legacies from the past provide numerous potential sources of tension and friction. Distrust among the ancient peoples of continental South-East Asia — that is, the Burmese, Thais, Khmers and Vietnamese — runs very deep and this has been accentuated by recent developments, such as the Thai Government's decision to allow fighter aircraft of the American Air Force to use Thailand as the base for assaults on North Vietnam and the present shooting-war between Vietnamese Communist guerrillas and Khmer soldiers in Cambodia. Latent hostility between the immigrant and indigenous peoples exists in Nusantara. This is

sharpened by the rise of Singapore, within the midst of Nusantara, a state with an overwhelming immigrant majority. Religious loyalties are very strong and they tend to transcend territorial boundaries. Clashes between Christians and Muslims in Mindanao worry the Catholic hierarchy in Manila and the Christian parties of the Philippines as much as UMNO of Malaysia and Nahdatul Ulama of Indonesia. Killings of Muslim guerrillas in southern Thailand by Thai patrols cause anxiety among ulamas in Kelantan.

In addition, there are the frontier territories which are at present a potential dispute. The most outstanding case is Sabah which the Philippines claims. Cambodia has a dormant claim to Kampuchea Krom, the Mekong delta that now forms part of South Vietnam. Thailand may revive her longstanding claims to Battambang, Siemreap, Champassak and Sayaboury and possibly even Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Kengtung and Mongpan.

It is clear that intra-regional disputes may arise from time to time. It is, therefore, imperative that, in addition to a formal international conference endorsing the neutralization of South-East Asia, an intra-regional mechanism for conflict-resolution be created. Of course, the states of South-East Asia may not be able to eliminate conflicts among themselves entirely but the probability is that intra-regional, inter-state conflicts will be neither wide in scale nor long in duration in the event of non-interference by great outside powers.

THE RELEVANCE OF NEUTRALITY

N. S. MUTHANA

The simplest definition of neutrality in international affairs is a policy of not assisting any of the belligerent nations in the event of a war. The oldest practitioner of this sort of neutrality is Switzerland and, during world war II Turkey and Sweden also pursued a similar policy with some degree of success and profit. I should like to dub this the "classical pattern of neutrality". No high moral virtue attaches to it, though. In fact one recalls that behind the cheese, chocolate and cuckoo-clock image of Switzerland there were the Swiss trader and banker, doing deals, not always of an edifying nature, with all the belligerents and with an unconscionable evenhandedness. Numbered account facilities were made as readily available to private citizens and government functionaries of the Allied States as they were to those of the Axis countries. Neutrality also implied an amiable tolerance of if not indifference to sordid espionage activities on neutral soil by the belligerent powers. There was no question of distinguishing the good from the evil, the moral cause from the immoral one. Money, from whatever quarter it came, was good money. Percentages were paramount and conscience, ideals and even the little human decencies were a crashing irrelevance. Participation in Red Cross activities and organising prisoners of war exchanges under Red Cross aegis apparently took care of an uneasy conscience.

Here I must add that Turkey's role was marked by an element of *gaucherie*, a result of lack of experience which Switzerland had. Nevertheless, its role as a neutral state was no less impeccable than that of Switzerland. Turkey perhaps profited a little less. The classical pattern of neutrality had its uses for the belligerent powers. They used the neutral soil for their intrigues which of course the neutrals didn't mind. Not for them the moral issues; for them the rich fall-out from other people's wars and the attendant miseries.

But those powers which actively participated in the war regarded the neutral powers with something approximating an Athenian contempt for the venal. Which explains their expressions of mild disgust at the mention of neutrality, particularly in the immediate post-war years. The Freudian connotations of neutrality occasionally coloured the foreign policy attitudes of some states. The classical pattern of neutrality has lost its relevance, though, for purely selfish reasons, such as furthering subversive activities, for instance, the pristine virginity of Switzerland's neutrality is unlikely to be violated. Its banks are useful. Here I must point out that in the lexicon of the big powers on potential belligerents subversion's what Dale Carnegie would call winning friends and influencing people. Turkey ceased to be a neutral when it realised that the Soviet Union, its traditional antagonist, was breathing hotly down its back. Moreover, Turkish neutrality had the limited aim of spotting the winner and latching on to it. On the winning side it chose the western powers which at the time had an edge over the Soviet Union which had not yet developed atom bomb.

This does not, however, mean that big powers today regard neutrality as a tedious irrelevance or a stumbling block as, for instance, they did the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos. On the contrary neutrality has never been more relevant than it is today. And in the present context of the global power game and a multi-polar power system, big and small countries in the developing world cannot expect to preserve their sovereignty in all its totality by taking sides with one or the other of the super-powers. If they do take sides they will automatically surrender part of the sovereignty and with it a lot of their national pride. They will also be compelled to trim their national aims to fit into the global strategic aims of the dominant power with which small states have nothing in common anyway. The Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty is a case in point. And this doctrine is not an aberration peculiar to the Soviet Union. Every major power, including those who pretend not to be, have their own refined versions of limited sovereignty for their client states.

A policy of avoiding involvement with big powers is commonly described as a policy of non-alignment. Non-alignment itself has never been precisely defined. Non-aligned countries, for instance, do not call themselves neutral states for, among other reasons, neutrality, in modern semantics implies an unconscionable unconcern for the environmental pollution caused by power politics and a pathological incapacity for taking initiatives even where it is both possible and imperative for maintaining world peace. A reasonably viable definition of non-alignment would be an attempt to keep out of the contests of the established super-powers and to create conditions in which areas not directly affected by the cold war hitherto, do not become theatres of it. That, I believe, is non-alignment in its most acceptable form and whose major policy aim would be to neutralise not one country here and another there but on a regional or a coherent geopolitical basis. The semantic jugglery apart, non-alignment, in fine, is neutrality with a conscience and a firm will to survive without being pushed around like inconsequential and expendable pawns by the great powers.

In practice, however, non-alignment or neutrality during the worst days of the cold war meant many things to many countries. To some it was the art of resisting involvement in military pacts which at some point in time threatened to divide the world into two blocs of belligerents or potential belligerents. Those who thought up military pacts, I suspect, believed, unwisely, of course, that future world wars were both inevitable and perhaps even desirable. Non-alignment was also a convenient instrument of policy to play one power off against the other. Less cynically, it was an ideal which very nearly became an ideology. Friendship with all countries, irrespective of their social and political structures, and occasionally, the role of honest broker between rival powers were the essential characteristics of non-alignment as was practised, by India. But the going became very rough for New Delhi after the Sino-Indian hostilities in 1962. Non-alignment ceased to be the basis of India's policy towards China. Despite New Delhi's

protestations to the contrary, it is highly unlikely that Peking will persuade itself into the belief that the latest Indo-Soviet treaty is consistent with the concept of non-alignment.

Because of the deviations by some traditionally non-aligned countries, notably India and Egypt, non-alignment cannot be written off as non-viable. The alternative to it is alignment and the logical sequel to alignment is the very real and irresistible compulsions to accept a client-state status. In the South-East Asian context, the primary concern of nation states is survival and survival with dignity. Survival is perhaps possible in a somewhat precarious and undignified manner if any given state is content to become the hod-carrier of a big power. In that event the ruling elite of the country concerned derives its authority to govern not from the people but from the protective power with which it is aligned. In such a situation the ruling elite's concern for what is commonly understood as the national interest will be minimal and consequently national stability that is political, economic and social stability will come under constant and severe strains. This is true of all countries which have tied themselves to military pacts sponsored by the big powers. It is important to note that military alignment does not necessarily improve the relations between the dominant and dependent states. Soviet relations with Hungary and Czechoslovakia are not substantially different from the relations between the United States and some of its partners in military pacts it has sponsored. The hostile sentiments, particularly at the popular level, between dominant powers and their satellites, are not an unnatural development. Mutual resentment govern the relations between the dominant and the dependent, a very human characteristic at the level of individuals which between nations could develop into frightening proportions.

Then there is also the risk of the dominant power imposing its ideology and its political institutions on the dependent or client state, irrespective of the very real possibility that the graft may not quite take. The rejection by client states of such impositions can be very difficult as Mr. Dubcek of Czechoslovakia and Imre Nagy of Hungary discovered. Even where there is no active or violent rejection syndrome, such as in many Asian countries which have accepted or are experimenting with alien political institutions, legacies of the colonial powers, tensions become inevitable. This, one may ascribe to the inherent arrogance of imported doctrines which seek to mould societies in the image of the countries to which those doctrines are native. This particularly unpleasant and undesirable consequence of alignment also inhibits and quite often stunts the growth of indigenous ideologies and political institutions. The result could be as pathetic as, say, an Asian writer imitating a Hemingway without of course going through old Papa's experiences. In such a situation, tensions, as I said earlier, are inevitable and tensions mean trouble.

These are only some of the perils of military involments with the super-powers and they are also the rationale of neutrality. It is

worth emphasising that the national interests of South-East Asian countries have next to nothing in common with those of the big powers. Moreover, the national interests of the big powers dovetail with their global aims with which developing countries can scarcely identify themselves.

Foreign policy among other things, is an exercise in balancing a country's internal resources with those of its external commitments. In a military tie up with any one of the giants this exercise would be wholly futile. From this it automatically follows that all developing countries with limited resources have a permanent vested interest in non-involvement in big power contests.

Developing countries have a community of interests, notably survival and development which can be ensured only if groups of countries in a given region strive to keep that region as a zone free from big power rivalries. This is precisely what General de Gaulle had in mind when he suggested the neutralisation of South-East Asia as far back as 1964, and a refinement of this, I venture to suggest, represents the gist of Malaysia's foreign policy aim.

One does not suggest a wholesale banishment of the big powers from any region desiring such a thing would be impossible. Rather the neutralisation of a region postulates that it should not be converted into an arena of big power conflicts. Hence the need for big power guarantees to ensure that the neutrality of the region is wholly viable.

Is this too idealistic?

No.

The detente in Europe, once an unfocussed aspiration, is now almost as good as a reality. For all practical purposes, this detente, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Disarmament conference amount to meaningful steps towards the neutralisation of the European continent. Polarisation in continental Europe along ideological lines will undoubtedly be there, but that is not necessarily a cause or potential cause of tensions leading to war.

European powers have discovered that their military pacts are archaic and have served no purpose except that of creating a tower of tension in the continent. The military content of the North Atlantic Treaty was aimed at the military content in the Warsaw Pact. One assumed that the other was designed for aggression and, the promoters as well as the participants in the rival pacts, took it for granted that deterrent or aggressive postures were obligations necessary for this planet's continued existence.

A neutral South-East Asia, with the neutrality guaranteed by the big powers, presupposes that neutralisation of this region is not

unacceptable to the would-be guarantors. Admittedly, the super-powers have their own global aims, political and strategic, but these derive their substance to a large extent from the willingness of nation states eager to seek military patronage of the big powers. In the cold war years when some states found or fancied it necessary to have such patronage choosing the protector was relatively easy for there were only two of them ready, willing and able to provide protection. Now there are three and a fourth one is well on the way. This makes the choosing of a power to align with immensely difficult. Also it will be impossible to play one power against the other. Such a game would be suicidal. In the circumstances the only practical policy is the neutralisation of regions like South-East Asia, the Indian Ocean and beyond.

The question arises whether the super powers will have enough good reasons not to violate the neutrality they may guarantee under the proposed scheme.

Yes.

For any violation of regional neutrality could result in another spell of cold war for which no big power is anxious and much less prepared. The chances of the giants dividing themselves into two opposing teams do not readily exist. The plain fact is that the national interests of the super powers do not converge and if there are points of similarity between them they are a result of the existence of areas which invite, directly or indirectly, big power rivalries on the ideological plane, leading, sooner or later, to rivalries at the military level. In any event, it is ridiculous to suppose that war is the preoccupation of big powers. Whatever their political and ideological differences they too have realised that with their overkill nuclear potential any military showdown could be the end of the world in whose continued existence they have a big stake.

To them neutralisation of South-East Asia would have the same relevance as the present detente in Europe. Neutralisation is possible if the countries in the region agree on the few basic things spelled out by Malaysia, such as no-war pacts among the countries of the region, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and sensibilities. It is here that skilful diplomacy can play a useful part. Neutralisation does not necessarily mean the pursuit of common domestic and foreign policies by all the countries of the region. Each can still exercise its national preferences in matters pertaining to trade, economic development and so on. It will not in any way reduce the options of any country in the conduct of its foreign policy.

The big power guarantees will have to be restricted to the extent of eschewing temptations to engage in ideological, political and

strategic rivalries all of which, in the long haul, amount to mutual subversion and the subversion of small and developing countries. Such political changes as may occur in any country in the neutral zone would be spontaneous, not a result of foreign interference and, therefore, not incompatible with the genius and ethos of the state concerned.

Recent developments in international relations clearly show that the great powers are profoundly tired of cold wars and are equally profoundly apprehensive about hot wars or nuclear shooting matches. All of which makes the neutralisation of South-East Asia not just theoretically relevant but a very practical proposition.